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ABSTRACT 
 
NICHOLAS CONSTANTINE KANIOS 
Contemporary Polish Security Policy: Are NATO Benefits at Risk? 
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Jenkins) 
 What the future holds for Poland’s reliance on the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is unknown.  As the war in Afghanistan dwindles down, 
NATO’s members look forward to bringing home their troops and to reducing further 
their military budgets.  A military capability gap on both sides of the Atlantic is 
Poland’s primary concern, even if the US narrows this gap with its presence in 
Europe.  As a result, Poland’s security concerns resurfaced when America announced 
a strategic shift from Europe towards Asia in January 2012.  America has pledged to 
continue its NATO commitments as a reassurance to European security.  The Polish 
political elite, however, is skeptical about NATO’s future ability to provide security 
to Poland’s territory. 
 This paper addresses whether a shift in US military strategy towards Asia and 
Europe’s declining military budgets pose a threat to Poland’s security apparatus.  The 
author argues that, in spite of concerns from either sides of the Atlantic, an American 
strategic refocus toward the Asian-Pacific will not threaten Poland’s security. 
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In January 2012, the US Obama Administration made an announcement that its 
security strategy was pivoting towards Asia.  America’s refocusing its security interests 
toward the Pacific from the Atlantic, coupled with the administration’s announcement that 
Europe was no longer in danger, caused anxiety not only in Europe, but also in America as 
well.  As a new and proactive member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
Poland has been advocating for a stronger Alliance; rather, it has pushed for a European 
commitment to collective security, worried that US forces will eventually depart from 
Europe. 
 What has Poland’s political elite gained by becoming a member of NATO? One can 
view Poland’s accession to NATO as a prerequisite for entering the European Union (EU), 
which it accomplished in 2004.  Most importantly, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
signed April 4, 1949, Poland receives a security guarantee from NATO to defend Polish 
territory.
1
  As a member of the Alliance, Poland minimizes its security concerns and plays a 
major role in shaping NATO’s defense policy. The credibility of the alliance is currently in 
question, as national defense budgets continue to decline and military capabilities are slowly 
diminishing.  The fundamental issues in Polish security have been associated with NATO’s 
stance on European security.  One source of disappointment for Poland was the outcome of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 For more details on Article 5, see What is Article 5? Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/ 
terrorism/five.htm 
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the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) that NATO held during the Chicago 
Summit on May 2012: differences of opinion among the Alliance members about the need to 
retain a US nuclear weapon arsenal in Europe divided the Organization.
2
  Another 
disappointment for Poland is the neglect of conventional military capabilities by NATO 
members – with the exclusion of the US and France –which continues to widen the gap in 
transatlantic relations.  The last major issue involves concerns about technology transfers 
through the acquisition business from NATO countries to non-NATO countries.
3
  Overall, a 
grave concern for the Polish elite stems from the perceived lack of interest or political and 
military will of the Alliance – the diminishing commitments to European security – that 
Poland foresees as jeopardizing its own security strategy.  
 The main objective of my thesis is to analyze whether future changes to NATO  pose 
a threat to Poland’s security apparatus.  Is the on-going debate about the decrease in NATO 
commitments from its members a legitimate concern to the Polish security? This question 
gets at the greater ability of NATO to fulfill its collective security guarantees in the face of 
declining military budgets and as the United States shifts its military focus to the Pacific. 
 This topic provides a lens through which to investigate whether Poland’s security is 
really at risk as the Alliance struggles financially to maintain its obligations.  In answering 
this question, my thesis argues that Polish concerns about a diminishing NATO commitment 
from its members are nonetheless warranted, but realistically such concerns do not diminish 
military capabilities that NATO provides for Poland’s security.  In order to answer this 
question, my thesis argues that although there is a differentiation in NATO commitments 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 Durkalec, Jacek (2012) Assessment of NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. The Polish Institute 
of International Affairs. Bulletin No. 55 (388)  2;738-39 
 
3
 Ibid., 739 
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between members of the Alliance, realistically such differentiation does not diminish military 
capabilities that NATO provides for Poland’s security.  
 Even in the face of continuing European defense cuts, America demonstrates a 
commitment to European defense by providing specific military capabilities that are vital to 
realizing both NATO and Poland’s security objectives.   For instance, the threat of a ballistic 
missile (long or medium-range) attack on Poland’s territory is eliminated by a US missile 
shield capability.  The United States also supports NATO’s 2010 strategic concept, a renewal 
of a 1999 document which focused on issues from missile defense to terrorism to cyber 
warfare, and that also included a pledge between the Alliance members to support the war in 
Afghanistan.  The US can even supplement conventional military ground operations, or 
“boots on the ground,” by deploying its troops  in Europe.  At the core, the transatlantic 
security architecture, or the ability of NATO to provide global security, is an asset that 
neither America nor its European allies would want to give up. 
 In spite of this commitment, however, defense budget cuts are affecting European 
armies by diminishing their distinct military capabilities.  A large number of Europe’s 
medium-sized states are cutting their defense budgets by anywhere from 10 to 15 percent.
4
  
As a result of these defense budget cuts and shortfalls in military capabilities, these countries 
will no longer support NATO’s current strategic concept.  It has been more than a decade 
since NATO members discussed the idea of “pooling and sharing” their resources in order to 
save money, but the alliance members feel uneasy about entrusting their state sovereignty to 
one another. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
 O’Donnell, Marina C.et al. (2012). Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's 
largest members. 30; 5. Center of the United States and Europe, Brookings. 29; 4 
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 My thesis examines the framework of Polish defense strategy in relation to NATO-
Polish objectives briefly from the interwar period through the end of the Cold War, and then 
up until the present.  It takes into account economic and political developments that affect the 
defense industry and the interplay between domestic party politics, as these variables 
certainly influence Poland’s security policy. However, the main purpose of this thesis, 
however, is not to focus on such variables, but; rather, I seek to analyze the premise of Polish 
security policy in relation to NATO. 
 I conclude that Poland’s political elite, or individuals of authority who take part in 
national decisions, has no choice but to continue to defend its official position on the future 
challenges that NATO security faces.  In order to ensure congruity between Poland’s security 
policy and Polish security strategy, the country’s leaders will continue to push for a tighter, 
more cooperative agenda to combat the effects of ongoing European defense cuts.  From this 
perspective, Poland’s political elite cannot afford to disregard the soft and hard power 
(diplomacy and military force) it receives from the US-NATO relationship; indeed, absent 
such a relationship, Poland would become insignificant in world affairs, and there is too 
much at stake for Poland’s security policy.  Poland’s sacrifices for the war on terror – 
referred by the US Obama administration as the “Overseas Contingency Operations” - have 
been immense.  Poland bears a much greater combat burden than other members of the 
Alliance.  Poland might be, in this sense, working too hard for the NATO membership 
benefits common to all members without receiving a voice (i.e. political influence) equal in 
power to that of more established members. 
 There are political, military, and economic benefits for Poland that make it worth 
preserving the foundations of a strong NATO Alliance.  First, Poland will be able to 
!!
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minimize its national security concerns and play a major role in shaping NATO’s defense 
policy. Second, Poland has already benefited and continues to benefit from modernizing, 
training, and transforming its military into a NATO-interoperable military force. Third, as a 
member of the Alliance, the shared costs of collective security are less than 0.5 percent of 
each member’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) defense expenditures.
5
  Hence, the benefits 
of NATO membership outweigh the costs that are incurred by the European national defense 
budgets.  Further, even small collaborations between regional alliances that constitute the 
second pillar of Poland’s security policy, or the pursuit of a comprehensive Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with the aim to replace NATO would not be realistic 
unless America’s allies had similar military capabilities. 
 This thesis analyzes one segment of Polish security, particularly the element of 
defense security, or the security of a state’s territory and sovereignty, in Poland’s 
contemporary national security policy.  It focuses on NATO as the main actor providing a 
security guarantee for Poland, and confirms that, even amidst ongoing public debate over the 
diminishing military capabilities of European states (in relation to European security and the 
world economic crisis), Poland’s security will not be in jeopardy as long as United States 
continues to be a member of the alliance. 
  This thesis begins by examining critical junctures in Poland’s security policy 
transition from the interwar period until present.  It investigates costs and benefits associated 
with Poland’s membership in NATO and concludes with an in-depth analysis of current 
changes in NATO as critical to the establishment of Poland’s contemporary security policy.  
The scope of this thesis does not include examining either the role of Poland in regional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 Kriendler, John. (2007). Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges. 
Occasional Papers No. 12. George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies: 21;6 
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alliances or Europe’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). To expand my study in 
this way would detract from my focus on answering questions about future challenges for 
NATO. 
  This paper uses primary and secondary sources from the Internet and printed 
reference material to substantiate its conclusions.  I found these works by reviewing 
published books, journals, magazines, government documents, reports, newspapers, and 
encyclopedias from the 1970s to today in an effort to explore my central question using a 
comprehensive  approach.
6
  My argument relies upon multiple American, Polish, and 
European perspectives; these different lenses provide a broad window onto the Polish-NATO 
security relationship.  
 For clarity purposes, the nouns ‘collective security’, ‘multilateralism’, and 
‘regionalism’ require definitions.  First, collective security in the context of military alliances 
(such as NATO) is when more than one state actor is involved in a military alliance for the 
purpose of protecting or repelling a third.
7
 In practical terms, collective security is central to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
 I have looked at American and European think tanks to assess security and foreign policy. I searched on 
academic/research institutions like the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) of Defense Academies and 
Security Studies Institutes, the National Defense University, the US Army War College, the Naval Post-
graduate School, and the George C. Marshall Institute. I have followed events and read primary sources in the 
news media like Reuters, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Warsaw Business Journal and the 
Warsaw Voice newspaper, public access information from Polish government websites, the US State 
Department, the Associated Press, NATO Source, Atlantic Council, Foreign Policy Association, and Foreign 
Affairs. I gained a lot of insight from European and American institutes on security like the Polish Institute for 
Strategic Studies, the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP), the American Brookings Institute, STRATFOR, Council on Foreign Relations, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Strategic Forecasting Inc (STRATFOR). I accessed library 
printed material from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, contacted Poland’s National Security Bureau 
and the US Embassy in Warsaw requesting information on developing events in Polish security. See Works 
Cited 
 
7
 Collective defense is a union of states that on the basis of treaties create an organization for the purpose of 
defending the members of the organization. It is emphasized that ‘collective security’ falls under the category of 
international relations and it should not be confused with ‘military alliances’ that have an objective in defending 
members of the alliance (such as NATO). See: de Wet, Erika, Wood, Michael. (2010). Collective Security, Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
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the mission of NATO, which is also referred to as the Alliance.  Multilateralism is “the 
practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc 
arrangements or by means of institutions.”
8
  Multilateralism can also be used to mean 
multilateral defense initiatives or a state seeking a defense relationship with another or others.  
Third, regionalism, in the context of security, alludes to those states with “a common sense 
of identity and purpose … that express a particular identity and shape collective action within 
a geographical region.”
9
   In literal terms, regionalism is used to indicate specific 
geographical regions; however, the word regionalism is not often utilized in a security 
context.  In this paper, the phrase “regional defense cooperation” will be used instead of 
regionalism, as it is more appropriate to military affairs. Finally, the concept of security also 
demands a specific explanation, as there are many understandings of the contemporary 
security environment. As these terms are used interchangeably, the concept of security 
requires close analysis, since security is defined differently throughout the literature. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
 A multilateral arrangement in a global sense refers to NATO, while a ‘regional military cooperation’ is used 
interchangeably with a ‘multilateral defense cooperation’ or a ‘multilateral military cooperation’.  
See Keohane, Robert O. (1990). “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research.” International Journal, 45:731 
 
9
 ‘Regionalization’ in reference to the ‘New Regionalization Approach’ actually refers to the economic and 
human development in a particular geographic region.  However, regionalization differs in that it relies on 
observation in the improvement of relations (cooperation) and regional unity of states in a geographical region. 
See Fawcett, Louise. (1996). "Regionalism in Historical Perspective". Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organization and International Order. Oxford University Press 
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CHAPTER II: 
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY 
 The question of what defines the term security is in the eye of the beholder, as the 
concept encompasses an array of issues and concerns.  Because security strategy reflects 
states’ interests, it is very difficult to settle upon a universal definition.  Nonetheless, security 
can be described as an arrangement of conditions relating to national security issues with 
realistic aims and a clear path leading to policy making.
10
  The question remains, however: 
can threats to security be assessed in simple terms of descriptions, compositions, and 
methods?   
  The concept of security can be explained accurately in comprehensive terms using a 
predictable theoretical framework.
11
   Scholars who study security theory – mainly 
international relations theorists - say that security should be based a synthesis of theory and 
experience, i.e. personal security is tied to state and global security.  They also maintain that 
as an assessment tool to define its security objectives, a state should identify what 
capabilities it has or does not have, that prevent it from deterring a new threat.
12
 
    There is another perspective, however, which eliminates completely our ability to 
define security.  Security is hard to define as a concept, since in meaning it constantly 
changes in relation to new threats.  Hence, as a field of study security has been neglected in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
 Baldwin, David. (1997). “The concept of security.” Review of International Studies, 23:5-26;6 
 
11
 Ibid., 7 
 
12
 Ibid., 7-8 
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the past.  David A. Baldwin, a political scientist, argues that one cannot rely on a definition 
of security as a neglected concept in designing our own theory of security.13   Per his 
interpretation of a “neglected” concept, security is characterized as a complicated theory that 
is frequently abandoned by field experts.  It is a combination of power and security one that 
is challenged by a fast paced technology and policy.14  Emma Rothschild, a British economic 
historian, makes her own attempt to parse the concept of security within the realm of 
academia. Rothschild refers to Arnold Wolfers (1892–1968), an international relations expert, 
who argued that the basic definition of security is nonexistent threats to obtained values.15   
  Baldwin considers another important question for security, which would be one to 
answer when considering security strategy in the early stages of analysis or calculation. He 
views identifying the beneficiary of security as important in determining realistic security 
goals.  What constitutes adequate security?16 Even if this important question has an answer, 
the assessment of how to address a given threat differs.  Baldwin’s insight on security theory 
illustrates the systemic problems in the field of security studies.  We can conclude, however, 
that concept of security has evolved beyond perceived threats to state sovereignty or to 
human security.  It now includes also other forms of threats that security providers 
themselves can identify.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ibid., 10 
 
14 Ibid., 8-9 
 
15 In this article, Rothschild begins its article with examples of security corresponding to significant time 
periods in history; the latest time-period of significance in defining national security were the 1990’s after the 
Cold War as human rights became the liberal urge for freedom in the former Warsaw Pact members. She also 
illustrates how other scholars view security as a contested topic have often failed to define security conceptually, 
since they rely on empirical evidence of policymakers to support their claims. See: Rothschild, Emma. (1995). 
“What is Security?” Daedulus,124(3):53!98 
 
16 Ibid., 13,15, & 26 
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  The security environment is a place where states compete against each other for self-
interest.  Kenneth Waltz, a political scientist, states that, “In anarchy, security is the highest 
end…. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and 
power.”17  An earlier concept of security gives the meaning of security a choice, either one 
has it or not. The concept of security is simplified in this quote from General Jacob L. 
Devers: “National security is a condition which cannot be qualified…. We shall either be 
secure, or we shall be insecure…. We cannot have partial security…. If we are only half 
secure, we are not secure at all.”18   Hence, security can be described as a condition where 
human beings or states have either reached their goal to deter a specified threat and safeguard 
their interests or not.  Since the security environment is also dynamic, the degree to which the 
state and human interests are safeguarded also has to be measured. 
  With regard to Poland, security involves the protection of Polish territory and 
sovereignty by internal and external means, is.  Internally, security is characterized as a “lack 
of threats, a nation’s ability to save its own values from the outer threats, and as a 
measurement of the chance of survival and development of the state, society, and citizens.”19 
An example of internal security is the utilization of Poland’s state agencies like the Internal 
Security Agency (the Polish version of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation) to identify 
and deter threats that jeopardize the functionality of the state.20  Externally, security hinges 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Baldwin. David A. (1995). “Security Studies and the end of the Cold War.” World Politics 48:117-141;72 
 
18 Ibid.,14 
 
19 Miros!aw Minkina (2011): Evolution of the Perception of Threats to the Security of the Republic of Poland in 
Polish Strategic Documents, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 24:622 
 
20 In close cooperation with Poland’s national defense forces and other agencies, the Internal Security Agency in 
many respects mirror the purpose of its American FBI counterpart. See the Internal Security Agency (Poland) 
on line. Retrieved from http://www.abw.gov.pl/portal/en/17/14/Our_Mission.html 
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on Poland’s alliances.  According to the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities for 2012-2016 (an 
official State document), one of Poland’s security objectives is “to keep our influence on the 
evolution of NATO and the EU.” The authors view “the preservation of the potential of these 
structures,” as “a condition of the effective implementation of the Polish security policy.”21 
Poland’s external security is also complimented by regional defense cooperation with its 
neighboring states.  Indeed, the State’s ability to safeguard its people and sovereignty has 
been a predominant issue in Polish foreign policy since Poland’s declaration of independence 
in 1918. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 In the beginning of 2012, the Polish government published the conduct of Poland’s foreign policy strategy, an 
official document that was last revised in 1989. See Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016 .(2012). 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. Page 14. Retrieved from 
http://mfa.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/goals_of_the_foreign_policy 
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CHAPTER III: 
ORIGINS OF A POLISH SECURITY CULTURE 
 According to experts on Polish security, the creation of a “security culture” traces its 
origins to the Interwar period (1918-39), a time of identity crisis and the solidification of two 
opposing political camps.  These two camps, participants in the “Pi!sudski/Dmowski debate,” 
continue to influence Polish politics, particularly in the realm of foreign policy.22 Though 
both camps related to issues of Polish nationalism differently, the divide  nevertheless 
marked a new beginning in Polish politics.   
 Józef Klemens Pi!sudski, the General and the first Chief of State of Poland, had a 
profound influence on the framework of Poland’s security.  Pi!sudski’s early political life as 
an activist and his military leadership not only brought him fame among the Poles, but also 
enabled him to be the first candidate to lead the Polish Republic.23  One defining quality of 
the Pi!sudski camp is its characterization of Polish idealism: the state is perceived as a 
sanctified entity that should deny and fight its enemies.  Pi!sudski himself supported Poland’s  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Longhurst, Kerry Anne and Marcin Zabarowski. (2007). The new Atlanticist : Poland's foreign and security 
priorities, London : Chatham House ; Oxford : Blackwell, 113;2-3 
 
23  Pi!sudski formed the Polish Legions that were vital for Poland’s security and defense as a new Republic.  As 
a young activist, Pi!sudski lead the Socialist Party in the former Russian territory of Poland and created 
paramilitary groups to support the Polish nationalist cause against Russia. He also created a secret military 
organization called the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa. Afterwards, he became head of the Polish Socialist Party 
in Poland. See Holzer, Jerzy. (1977). The Political Right in Poland, 1918-39, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 12, No. 3, Sage Publications, Ltd:8;395-412;401 
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eastern neighbors in their fight for independence.24  As a result of Pi!sudski’s service as 
political head of the Polish Socialist Party and military alliances against the former Polish 
occupiers, he became a hero to a nationalist cause.25 
 The second camp, known at the “realist” camp, was founded on Dmowski’s views, 
which were quite different from Pi!sudski’s.   Dmowski was a politician and co-founder of 
the right wing National Democracy party.  Dmowski disagreed with Pi!sudski’s advocacy for 
multi-ethnicity and preferred a mono-ethnic state in which the minority would conform to 
Polish identity.26  On the topic of foreign affairs, Dmowski also opposed the idea of 
“extending an arm” in foreign policy; rather, he believed that relations with Russia were 
more favorable to Poland’s security than relations with Germany.  
The events that followed the German invasion of Poland in WWII also played a role 
in shaping Poland’s security culture.  Poland’s inability to halt its enemies and the 
unwillingness of its Western allies to assist with military force served as a credibility test for 
Polish security policy.  In three instances, Poland failed to provide for the security of its 
people and protect its state sovereignty: in the first instance, the Polish armed forces and the 
Warsaw Uprising did not defeat their enemies, while in the second instance, the pacification 
policy of the United Kingdom and France made Poles suspicious of their European alliances.  
In the third instance, reliance on the West after the end of the war became resulted in great 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Pi!sudski also believed in a poly-ethnic Polish state and the emphasis on foreign affairs to protect Poland’s 
sovereignty. Poland’s foreign affairs were backed by its military capabilities in pursuit of expanding its 
territories with Ukraine and Lithuania (the territory of Vilnius), and in resisting defeat from the Bolshevik 
movement of Russia.  Pi!sudski realized that a Polish geostrategic influence would only strengthen his position 
among his larger rivals, Germany and Russia.  Hence, a federation with Ukraine and Belorussia would provide 
Pilsudski with a resistance against Russian ambitions. Ibid., 5-9 
25 In the period of military dictatorship, Pi!sudski influenced foreign and defense policy in response to the 
Polish-Soviet conflict. See Bernhard, Michael. Institutional Choice and the Failure of Democracy: the Case of 
Interwar Poland, East European Politics and Societies 1998 (13: 34) 22. Print 
 
26 Longhurst, Kerry Anne and Marcin Zabarowski. (2007). The new Atlanticist : Poland's foreign and security 
priorities. London: Chatham House; Oxford: Blackwell, 113;2-10 
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Polish disappointment following a devastated land with an immense death toll resulting from 
the Annexation of Poland by Russia and the provisions in the Yalta agreement relinquishing 
Poland to the Soviets.27  Because these events shaped Poland’s security culture, a short 
examination of Interwar Poland and beyond will clarify the Polish view on security when 
assessing threat.  
 
The Interwar Period (1918-39) 
An examination of Poland’s security history from the interwar period until the present 
reveals that Poland’s allies have repeatedly ignored the country’s security concerns and/or 
made hollow collective security agreements.  Historically, Poland’s state sovereignty has 
been subjugated to other powers’ interests.  Prior to World War I (WWI), Poland was 
dominated for more than a century by three major powers: Habsburg Austria, the Kingdom 
of Prussia Germany, and the Russian Empire.28  In WWII, Poland was as a military 
battleground between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, where it functioned as a 
German military industrial complex and a location for German extermination camps.29  The 
Polish civilian population and its military forces were nearly eradicated in WWII, and its 
communist takeover by Soviet troops did not help rebuild a Polish state that had just begun to 
enjoy its sovereignty during the interwar period (1918-39). 
The role of the Second Republic in WWII continues to be an important influence on 
Polish security culture.  A territorial security guarantee was urgently sought by Ignace Jan 
Paderewski, Poland's first post-war prime minister.  In an official statement addressed to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Ibid., 11-2 
 
28 Snyder, T. (2010). Bloodlands!: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books. 524:6 
 
29 Ibid.,ix-x,x 
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League of Nations on September 18, 1919 he wrote: “Standing, as we are, between Germany 
on one side and Russia on the other, we cannot hope to maintain our integrity during these 
years, while we build up the strength of our people, unless we have the protection of the 
League.”30  Paderewski’s security concerns were genuine, but his efforts failed to convince 
the League of Nations.  
The idea that a central authority on the world stage could direct individual-state affairs 
seemed unrealistic, the governments of the League suspected.  As head of the government 
and the military of Poland, Pi!sudski believed that future military conflict was inevitable. The 
perceived threat of military attack by Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, along with 
distrust in the League of Nations’ commitment to provide collective security for its members 
concerned the Polish leadership.31  Hence, Poland’s security depended on its bilateral 
military alliances (in this case with France), and Polish diplomats had to act cautiously when 
conducting foreign diplomacy with the Soviet Union and Germany.  Such alliances and 
tactful diplomacy, however, did not prevent the outbreak of the war. 
As a young republic, Poland could not impress upon its Western allies the urgency of 
collective security, nor did it have the ability to shift the balance of power in Europe.  
Despite Pi!sudski’s military achievements when confronting the Russians, ()*!+,-./)!
0,-.(.12-!-*23*4/).0!4*2-.5*3!()*!-.6.(2(.,7/!,8!.(/!8,4*.97!0,-.1: when interacting with the 
United States and its stronger European allies.  Even though France served as a guarantor for 
Poland’s sovereignty, Poland’s inability to join the alliance of Little Entente (France’s 
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31 Pi!sudski’s concerns for Poland encountering a future conflict with its neighbors was reflected in Ignace 
Paderewski’s (Poland's delegate to the League of Nations) official statement to the League of Nations and 
should have been acknowledged as a warning sign to its members.  At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
Paderewski stated to the League that,  “The pressure is upon us on all sides through military action and through 
Bolshevist propaganda and an intense propaganda from Germany…. I fear for the safety of our [Polish] 
democracy.” See http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/poland_paderewski2.htm 
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alliance with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in response to Hungarian ambitions 
to restore the Habsburg Monarchy) was due partly to Czechoslovakia’s distrust of Poland’s 
desire for more territory.32 
Pi!sudski’s plans for dismembering the Russian empire and backing Ukrainian and 
Lithuanian independence ran contrary to US foreign policy towards Russia. President 
Woodrow Wilson believed that the United States had a moral commitment to protect Russian 
territory; in this regard, Poland’s conflict with Russia was not in concert with US Policy.  
The Bolshevik revolution was not a threat to Wilson, since self-determination was the 
foundation of his political philosophy.  He believed that a territorially intact Russia could be 
beneficial to the United States.  Pi!sudski thought otherwise, as he had personally 
experienced the Polish national struggle in his partitioned homeland that once belonged to 
the Russian empire; he saw instead an opportunity to fight against the Bolsheviks and 
neutralize the Russian threat.33 
The cumulative result of these events is that Poland has many reasons not to rely fully 
on International Organizations (IOs) for its security needs.  In terms established by the 
balance of power principle Poland was placed in a no-win situation, and the league could not 
fulfill its collective security purpose.  Articles X and XI of the League of Nations covenant 
stipulate that members were “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League” and 
that in the case of “any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the 
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32 Wynot, Edward D Jr. (1999, December). Review of Poland between the Wars, 1918-1939, by Peter D. 
Stachura. The American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 5, The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the 
American Historical Association (1792). Paper 
 
33 Winid, Boguslaw W. (1996, Fall). Review of After the Colby Note: The Wilson Administration and the 
Polish-Bolshevik. Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, Intricacies of U.S. Foreign Policy: Blackwell 
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Members of the League or not …  the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise 
and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”34 
The reality was that the concept of collective security was ambiguously defined in the 
League of Nations covenant (containing 26 articles).  Although the covenant was drafted by 
the US President, even Congress did not want America to become a member of the League.  
The failure of the League of Nations to provide collective security for Poland highlights the 
weaknesses of collective security organizations. 
 
Poland and the Warsaw Pact 
Throughout the Cold War, Poland’s security was primarily in the hands of the Soviet 
leadership.  Prospects for regaining an independent security policy for the new communist 
government in Warsaw were not too promising, and agreements between the Western 
Alliance and the Communist Bloc were not carried out as indicated.  Although the 1945 
Yalta agreement assured U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister 
Winston Churchill that Poland would be granted a freer and more democratic government by 
General Secretary Joseph Stalin, the opposite occurred. Soviet control of elections forced 
Poland to turn into a communist state, while Soviet troops committed atrocities against Polish 
citizens and soldiers alike.35  As a result of Poland’s integration into the Soviet Bloc, Poland 
found itself on the “other side” of the Iron Curtain with no agency on the international stage 
to dictate its own state affairs.  
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34 Ibid. 
 
35 Roberts, Geoffrey. (2007, Fall). Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences. Journal of Cold War 
Studies, Volume 9, Number 4: 6-40 
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A Subordinate Warsaw Pact Strategy and Policy 
The redrawing of Poland’s borders in favor of the Soviet Union as detailed in the Yalta 
agreement effectively enforced the surrender of Poland’s sovereignty to Stalin’s own security 
ambitions.  The German question, resolved by the apportionment of Germany into zones of 
occupation, complicated Poland’s position.   Poland, together with East Germany, acted as a 
buffer zone between Western Europe and the Soviet Union; a direct confrontation from either 
side meant battle on Polish and East German soil.36  This contributed to the West’s 
perception that Poland was either part of the Soviet problem or an enemy of NATO.  
The Polish leadership was aware that if any military conflict occurred between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact alliance, Central Europe would be the first battleground of conflict. The 
Polish defense strategy was based on the Warsaw Pact’s threat perception in response to the 
Berlin Crisis.37  Hence, the strategy was mainly aimed at deterring threats posed by NATO 
and at maintaining a good relationship with Soviet Russia to preserve Poland’s territorial 
security.38  Nonetheless, the scenario of a military conflict on Polish territory was a reality 
that was inescapable. 
Against its will, Poland would indeed be brought into military conflict.  Polish military 
doctrine stated that, in case of war, Poland would autonomously handle the conflict, which 
meant operationally commanding its own military without acknowledging that the military 
forces which defended Poland’s territory were part of United Armed Forces (belonging to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 The Polish perception of threat was expected to be that of its Warsaw Pact members, which meant that a war 
by conventional means would meet NATO forces in Northern Europe. Poland regarded its threat perception to 
be West Germany’s invasion where it would serve as a gateway for NATO’s troops. See Threat Perception. 
(1992). Retrieved from http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/poland/ poland244.html 
 
37  Caravelli M. John. (1983). “Soviet and Joint Warsaw Pact Exercises: Functions and Utility.” Armed Forces 
& Society Spring 9: 393-426; 397 
 
38 Mastney Vojtech. (2002). The New History of Cold War Alliances. Journal of Cold War Studies 4.2:55-84;80 
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Warsaw Pact).39 Indeed, Poland, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, could not have an 
independent security policy even if military doctrine advocated for the autonomous control of 
its military forces. 
Poland’s lack of control in its own state affairs meant not having an independent 
security policy and no options other than to rely on the Warsaw Pact.  The Russian military 
that was based in Poland prevented the Polish government from pursuing an independent 
national security strategy, one that would most likely have contradicted the Warsaw Pact’s 
security strategy.40 In addition, Poland lacked strategic think tanks, and the General Staff of 
the Polish Army was even unable to determine a viable defense strategy.  By the late 1980s 
Poland’s defense strategy had become defensive rather than offensive.41  Meanwhile, the 
Polish strategy focused on being able to assemble military formations on the Polish border 
and face the enemy.  
There were instances during the Cold War, however, where Poland did attempt to 
influence Soviet security policy.  The majority of the time, Poland’s rather subordinate Cold 
War security strategy (which entailed complimenting the Warsaw Pact’s security policy) was 
inhibited by Soviet control from Moscow; however, it did exhibit individual-state tendencies 
during notable events in Cold War history.  For instance, Poland’s leaders, particularly 
Minister Adam Rapacki angered both sides by proposing the institution of a nuclear-free 
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40 Wojciechowski, S!awomir. (2008). Dilemmas of Polish Military Strategy. Strategy Research Project. Gabriel 
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zone in Central Europe to the United Nations in 1957.42  Then again in 1987 another plan to 
reduce nuclear threat in Central Europe was proposed by the Polish Government.43 
Civil-military relations  in Poland changed drastically in the final decade of the Cold 
War, when a weak Soviet Union could no longer squelch Polish aspirations for social and 
government reform, especially after the popular success of the Solidarity movement.44  
Poland was ready to adopt its own national security strategy before its transition to a Post-
Cold War country.  Another development that spurred these changes was the reduction of the 
Polish defense budget in the late 1980s in response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s measures to 
reduce Soviet military spending in the USSR. Gorbachev hoped that the NATO alliance 
would restructure and provide a security umbrella for the Warsaw Pact.45  Instead, this 
reduction of military forces coupled with the 1989 revolutions slowly shifted Poland’s 
national defense policy away from the Warsaw Pact’s feeble security structures toward the 
stronger ones embraced by NATO. 
 
The Solidarity Movement and the “Roundtable” Discussions  
  The Solidarity movement altered the course of Poland’s security policy.  Lech Wa!#sa, 
co-founder of the Solidarity (Solidarno"#) movement, became the voice of an alternative to 
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42  The Soviets first offered a similar plan before the Rapacki Plan, which proposed a conventional and nuclear 
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communist oppression by organizing an independent trade union.  The Polish communist 
government’s response to Solidarity led to the institution of martial law, the ban of Solidarity, 
and the imprisonment of its activists and Wa!#sa himself. General Jaruzeski, the communist 
leader in Poland, was denounced by US President Ronald Regan and Pope John Paul II for 
these events, culminating in US economic sanctions against Poland.46 This positive upturn in 
US-Soviet relations permitted Poland to conduct its foreign affairs in such a way as to bring 
about the end of communist rule in Poland. 
  Positive US-Soviet relations also changed the direction of Poland’s internal affairs, 
allowing Wa!#sa to negotiate the 1989 Round Table Agreement with the Polish United 
Workers' Party (PUWP, the Polish communist party). As a result, the PUWP government 
agreed to recognize Solidarity and permitted semi-free elections to take place, which led to 
changes in the electorate system to permit the creation of new parties.47 After several rounds 
of elections and the development of party coalitions to form a new government, Poland was 
on the road to democracy.  The Brezhnev Doctrine, the use of Soviet force to crush 
opposition to communist rule in the Eastern Bloc states, was now replaced by the Sinatra 
Doctrine, which was marked by Gorbachev’s relaxation of Poland’s governmental 
arrangements.48  Poland’s first Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was able to change the 
constitution (December 1989) to allow the restoration of a republic government (the Third 
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46 On a research thesis regarding the positive influence that United States had on Poland during the Cold War, 
Gregory A. Kinstetter, writes “through the use of both public and private diplomacy, the Reagan Administration 
impacted the people of Poland during the decade before the collapse of the Polish United Worker’s Party, and 
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Republic);49   Hence, the newly elected parliamentary government in Poland was able to 
conduct its own affairs without Moscow’s consent (for the most part).  In spite of these 
changes, it still relied on the Warsaw Pact for its collective security needs.
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49 Jaruzelski left his post as the First Secretary of the Poland`s Communist Party and served a relative short term. 
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Lech Wa!#sa became the president of the Third Republic of Poland. Soon after the first free parliamentary 
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CHAPTER IV: 
POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES TO POLAND’S SECURITY 
 
  The end of the Cold War brought unprecedented changes in the security environment, 
which effected Poland’s threat perception.  As the nature of security threats changed, so did 
Poland’s interests. First, the restructuring of the former Eastern Bloc states and the Baltic 
states into Western political and economic institutions impacted Poles.  Second, ?*4627:@/!
,88.1.2-!4*1,97.(.,7!,8!+,-273@/!A*/(*47!B,43*4/!A2/!4*9243*3!2/!2!0,/.(.C*!
3*C*-,06*7(D!273!4*3E1*3!+,-273@/!()4*2(!0*41*0(.,7.50  Third, following decades of 
Soviet oppression, Polish people now had aspirations for individual freedom that were in 
concert with the rest of the Western world.  
  Pi!sudski’s idealism was reborn in Poland, bringing hope to Polish people that they 
would soon join the rest of the free world.  Supporters of the Pi!sudski camp pushed for an 
independent republic in alliance with the West.51  In order to embrace this capitalist model, 
Poland’s political elite had to reject the structures of the communist regime. However, their 
ability to do so hinged on the capacity of Poland’s state institutions to embrace a more 
Western model, which mainly depended on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.  The post-
Cold War period was marked by significant changes in Poland’s security policy, as the 
balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was unexpectedly thrown off, allowing
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Poland’s security interests to be independently addressed.  These changes in the Post-Cold 
War balance of power invalidated the ideological structure of communism, which had to be 
rejected in order to restructure Poland as a Western democratic state.  This new security 
environment and its emerging threats had to be dealt with; the new republic was obligated to 
pursue its own foreign policy objectives without fear of Russian reprisal.  
  P,-273@/!04.624:!,BF*1(.C*!A2/!(,!*73!.(/!/*1E4.(:!4*-.271*!,7!()*!G24/2A!+21(!
1,E7(4.*/!B:!B*1,6.79!2!6*6B*4!,8!2!G*/(*47H/E00,4(*3!/*1E4.(:!/:/(*6I!.  However, 
the Polish political elite was aware of limitations in the foreign policies both in of West and 
the East.  To ignore the security arrangements of the Warsaw Pact without being a member 
of NATO posed a grave security risk. 
  By the early 90s, Poland had four options to choose from to ensure its security 
requirements were fulfilled: 1) establish regional security with its neighbors 2) claim 
neutrality and strengthen its defense posture 3) reestablish a relationship with Russia 4) reach 
out for trans-Atlantic security (EU and NATO).52!!The Polish elite considered opting for 
neutrality instead of a NATO, Soviet or regional solution to Poland’s security framework.53  
However, it was eventually determined that neutrality would leave Poland in an unfavorable 
position in case of war in its influence on foreign affairs.54 
  Poland’s elite had embraced a communist lifestyle and belief system for many years.  
The communist system could not be cast off quickly, as it had permeated all aspects of life. 
As a result, Poland was underdeveloped in terms of economy, democracy, and culture, 
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especially in comparison to their Western counterparts.55  Even though Poland had external 
bodies to help institute change, including the Polish-American Congress (Congress of 
Polonia) and the Roman Catholic Church headed by Pope John Paul II (a Polish native), the 
problem stemmed from their dependency the familiar Communist structure.56  Because of 
these traditions, opposition from Poles to accepting a Western security model (like NATO) 
during the transitional period was expected, especially from segments of the political elite. 
 Poland’s leaders had lived under the communist system their entire lives and 
changing from the familiar Warsaw collective security structure felt risky.  Leftist parties, 
like the Social Democracy , had an ideological and political attachment to Soviet Union, and 
they regarded the Warsaw Treaty as a guarantor of Poland’s security.57  Military cooperation 
between Poland and Germany placed Poland in a favorable position for NATO membership 
and helped to build confidence and trust.58   
  At the same time, NATO struggled to redefine its own identity, since the Warsaw 
Pact was no longer a threat to the West.  As a security organization in a divided world 
(NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact) the Alliance had a defined purpose and a clear threat; its 
members cooperated with NATO to achieve the common goal of defending the West against 
communism.  The Alliance recognized the need for military commitments, since the Soviet 
threat posed a grave danger to civilization.  Thus, NATO “was essentially an American tool 
for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat…. [and] with the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union …  NATO [had to] either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new 
distribution of power in Europe.”59 
  After communism collapsed, NATO had to identify a new vision to maintain its 
relevance, creating a rift in transatlantic relations. For the first time in history, NATO 
redefined its 1991 Strategic Concept to include new threats even beyond its borders and 
deployed its forces; this step was taken not in support of Article 5, but as part of the breakup 
of Yugoslavia.60 Questions about how the former Eastern Bloc states would become 
candidates for NATO membership remained unanswered. 
 
Polish security concerns about NATO membership 
 One of Poland’s security objectives was to change its security arrangements without 
damaging relations with the Soviet Union. The question of how to secede from the Warsaw 
Pact and join NATO was a difficult one to answer for Poland’s newly elected democratic 
government.  Poland was aware on the sensitivity involved in departing from the Warsaw 
Pact, because US-Russian relations were at their peak.;#! Besides, supporters of the Dmowski 
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camp defended the Soviet cause by reiterating the necessity of maintaining good relations 
with Russia.62   
  Polish security policy had relied on Soviet military doctrine and training for decades, 
questioning the loyalty of top military brass about favoring the transition to NATO.  General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski’s resignation as chairman of the Polish Council of State after the 1989 
Round Table Agreement helped Poland’s military to break ties from the Warsaw Pact.63  
Equally pressing was the transition from a Communist planned economy to a Western free-
market economy, which the Polish government enacted by drastically changing its economic 
policy.  
  Everyday life in Poland had depended on a rigid economic model where goods and 
services were exchanged within the Soviet Union.  Poland viewed NATO membership as a 
vehicle for membership in the European Community (the European Union’s predecessor).  In 
order to enter the European Community, however, Poland had to change its planned 
economic model to a free-market economy.  Despite these hurdles, the strength of the US-
Polish relationship along with political leadership from both sides made Poland’s entry into 
NATO possible.  In spite of this eventual success, the road to NATO membership proved a 
difficult one, since Poland’s direction post-Cold War was marked by ambiguity. 
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The Decade of Transition (1990-2000) 
   Poland struggled to make structural changes within the government and to reform the 
military.  There were key events and philosophies that characterized this transformation of 
Polish security policy. In the 1990s, Polish strategy focused on the quantity of defense rather 
than quality, and the military organization as a whole suffered as a result. Additionally, 
because it was the individual responsibility of ministers to take action in defense matters 
Poles failed to establish a legal framework that would permit required legislation to pass. 
Defense planning, programming, and long-term budgeting was negatively affected by a lack 
projection for defense expenditures, as well as by the absence of legal defense procedures 
and ongoing debate on field expertise.64  The resulting setbacks for military and defense 
planning were exacerbated by an incapacitated Polish defense industry, a paucity of state 
resources, and a poor core defense structure.  In addition, before revising its own security 
policy, the Polish government waited on a new NATO strategic concept from Washington, 
which delayed change. 
 At long last, a major leap in security policy occurred right after Poland’s 1999 
accession to NATO.  The 2000 Polish Defense Strategy, a defense project that became an 
official document, was not only compliant with the Security Strategy document and NATO’s 
strategic concept, but it provided a plan, procedures and concepts necessary to deploy the 
strategy in wartime, during a crisis, or in times of peace.65  It defined “national accountability” 
in a way that reflected the constitutional arrangement of the government with an all-
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encompassing defense concept that included the security environment in relation to Poland 
and its regional Alliances (NATO).  At the same time, it maintained flexibility in security 
policy and demanded a comprehensive defense system.66  In addition, regional security 
cooperation with the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) 
and with the Weimar Triangle (Poland, France, and Germany) served to supplement to 
Poland’s security, functioning as a cooperation mechanism to address regional security 
problems.67 
  One of the most crucial periods of Poland’s security policy transformation occurred 
between 1990 and 1993.  This initial period was distinct because Poland adopted its first 
Cold War security policy in favor of NATO, while it struggled to balance its political-
military framework and its legal framework.68  Polish foreign policy reflected a desire to 
avoid another “Yalta agreement.”69 
  Poland’s prosperous foreign relations with Russia lasted only two years before 
Yeltsin took office in 1993.  In the period from 1990 to 1992, Polish-Russian relations 
warmed under the Wa!#sa and Gorbachev governments, and Poland’s leadership was able to 
secure friendly treaties with Russia and Ukraine.  Despite these improvements, their 
interactions were not altogether smooth.  On one hand, talks between Poland and Russia kept 
both sides on a positive path towards removing Soviet military troops and their equipment 
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from Polish soil.70   On the other hand, the status of Kaliningrad, a territory under Russian 
jurisdiction bordering the Baltic Sea, Lithuania, and Poland, became of paramount 
importance to Moscow, and the Russian leadership suspected the countries bordering 
Kaliningrad (Germany, Poland, and Lithuania) were making claims to its territory.71  
  In other ways, too, Russia and the West further complicated Poland’s goal of NATO 
membership. The Russian perception of former Warsaw Pact states as prospective NATO 
members was rather dismissive, and Western politicians and scholars questioned the very 
viability of NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  In response to NATO’s passive 
interest in expansion, the Polish president came up with his own proposition for an economic 
and security cooperation among Poland’s neighbors.72 In addition, Poland’s national defense 
policy had to be retooled to provide the country’s elites with the stronger military they 
desired in anticipation of armed conflict. 
  The Polish government refocused its security system with the aim of deterring armed 
aggression against the state.  The 1990 defense doctrine on Polish security conceived of a 
non-confrontational style of security, under which Poland’s Central European neighbors 
would supplement Polish security with their own troops to form a multi-national force 
capability.73 This strategy was based on a low-intensity war scenario that Poland alone could 
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handle.  For a large-scale war scenario, the doctrine laid out a strategy for “convincing” the 
enemy that an invasion would be costly in terms of loss, while also persuading Poland’s 
allies to assist in a conflict.  It did not explore the prospect of nuclear war, but after 1992, 
security took a different approach.  This change, however, corresponded with defense policy 
making.  
  In actualizing its strategy through the constitution, Poland’s security policy did 
encounter an obstacle: the constitutional itself, determined responsibility for Poland’s 
security and control of the Polish armed forces.  This roadblock also had been a problem in 
the interwar period that led to Marshal Pi!sudski’s 1926 coup d'état, and it stood in his way 
while head he served of the country and the military.74 To obviate this issue, the 
arrangements in the constitution regarding control of Poland’s military had to be changed to 
conform with a democratic model of governance. The legal framework for defending the 
Polish homeland from military conflict were based on a 1967 statute that was amended in 
1991, granting the Poland’s president full control of the armed forces.75    Along with 
changes in the Polish constitution, however, came changes to its defense policy.  Because the 
National Defense Committee retained sole responsibility for enacting Poland’s security 
policy, this was later viewed as not so “constitutional.” 
  The main government body responsible for crafting laws and outlining agency 
obligations for state security (i.e. those of the government, financial institutions, social bodies, 
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74 The president of the Polish republic had limited powers.  The president did not have control of the armed 
forces, but rather the commander in chief was the highest ranking-general of the armed forces as a deputy 
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experts, and citizens) was the National Defense Committee, a committee that today deals 
with matters related to legislature on civil defense, territorial protection, and the armed 
forces.76  The main agent responsible for providing security, according to the Polish 
Constitution, was the Polish Armed Forces,. The new defense policy, based on the 1990 
defense doctrine, assumed a principle of “self-sufficiency,” whereby Poland could not rely on 
anyone else, including NATO or the Warsaw Pact, for its security.77  This policy underscored 
Poland’s ambivalence in aiming for NATO membership. 
  The new defense policy also highlighted the difficulties the Soviet Union experienced 
in transitioning out of the Cold War era.  Russia’s internal problems during its evolution out 
of communism were a major factor in determining Poland’s security policy.  One threat was 
the stationing of Russian troops transferred from East Germany and Poland with an arsenal of 
Soviet military hardware in Kaliningrad; another was the Carpathian military district of 
Ukraine’s Soviet Armed Forces.78 A third perceived threat was the fragile state of Russia’s 
democratic government, which could have transformed into a totalitarian or despotic 
rulership, reinstating the Soviet military presence in Poland.79  
  However, additional events outside the Soviet dilemma complicated Poland’s security 
situation further, and the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc created other perceived threats to the 
Polish assessment of security.  One was the anticipation of former Soviet republics 
transitioning into failed states, rather than to democracy.  Polish leaders feared potential 
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spillover from Yugoslavia, Lithuania, and Soviet Union over the Polish territory.80  Another 
had to do with establishing good relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania.81  To combat 
any spillover effects, Poland’s security strategies emphasized in building alliances.  
  After the Cold War, Poland started seeking regional security alliances.  These security 
alliances became a component of the new Polish security strategy as ways to prevent 
conflicts with Poland’s neighbors and to reduce the cost of defense expenditures.  As a 
precursor to Poland’s new security strategy, three NATO summits made it possible for the 
Alliance to begin talks with Poland.82  Following these events, the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) became the vehicles for 
NATO’s expansion eastward.83  Poland’s foreign affairs were non-linear over the next 
several years, but this didn’t halt its path to NATO membership.  Nonetheless, Poland’s 
ambitions for joining NATO went through a difficult period as its government institutions 
had to deal with their own problems of efficiency. 
  The 1990 Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Poland became obsolete, as it did not 
incorporate the new “Constitutional Act” that was drafted in 1992. Before the Small 
Constitution of 1992 (i.e. the new Constitutional Act) was established, the 1990 Defense 
Doctrine relied on an older Constitution (the previous socialist constitution of 1952) that 
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82 These three NATO summits took place from 1989 to 1991 in Brussels, London, and Rome.  The major theme 
in these summits was NATO expansion, or for NATO to take on the obligation in providing security for Poland 
and its Central European neighbors.  This crucial period of talks determined the need to radically change NATO 
doctrine and strategy for the first time in NATO history.  See Ku"niar,Roman, ed. (2001) Poland's Security 
Policy 1989-2000, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House: 606;30 
 
83 North Atlatnic Treaty Organization: What is NATO? (28) Retrieved from 
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prevented the institution of a Western-style economy with political freedoms.84 The Defense 
Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the Principles of Poland’s Security Policy were 
crafted in November 1992 by Poland’s National Defense Committee to reflect the new 
Constitutional Act.  The significance of the Constitutional Act is similar to that of the West: 
the Small Constitution described the “balance of power” within the main governing bodies 
while emphasizing collaboration and avoiding direct conflict between them.85  
 From 1994 through 1996, Poland’s relations with the US and NATO improved but 
grew worse with Russia.  As the Russian political elite realized Poland’s NATO membership 
was inevitable, the Russian government began to use coercive language in its foreign affairs.  
As a result, the Polish leadership grew more keen to pursue NATO membership while taking 
precautionary measures when interacting with Russian diplomats. Eventually, the Partnership 
for Peace (PFP) program made Poland’s accession in NATO possible, and the Moscow 
leadership deviated from its official position on Poland’s future membership in NATO by 
arguing against it.86  Perhaps by coincidence, Poland’s foreign policy displayed two 
contradictory points of view, one that was pro-Western and the other that was pro-Russian.  
In this way, the Polish government’s official foreign policy objectives, as represented by 
different by members of the Pi!sudski and Dmowski camps, could have been subject to 
misinterpretation.  Another factor that attributed to Poland’s accession in NATO was its 
positive relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).87 
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  In the case of war with an adversary like Russia, the aim of Poland’s defense strategy 
was to safeguard the state’s sovereignty, autonomy, and territory.  In 1996, the Political 
Strategic Plan for Poland’s defense, which was drafted by the Polish Ministry of Defense in 
coordination with other ministries and the National Security Bureau, became the first post-
Cold War document for war planning purposes,88 The Political Strategic Plan’s concept of 
defense was based on military assessments of threats from neighboring states that were 
unstable, a local conflict that was limited, and the possibility of engaging in a world war 
while relying on NATO or with UN assistance.  The concept outlined four major themes:    
1) It emphasized the strategic responsibilities of the agencies of the Armed Forces, ministries, 
and provinces. 2) In case of a military-political dilemma, the prospect of war was inevitable, 
but the Polish objective was to be its prevention. 3) Possible spillover effects from conflicts 
would jeopardize Poland’s sovereignty. 4) The defense concept included the utilization of all 
assets on what comprised the “defense system.”89  What followed the development of the 
defense concept was the commencement of a new strategic concept; this long pursued goal 
had finally been reached.   
  After the adoption of a new Constitution on April 2, 1997, Poland’s government 
pursued an autonomous security policy but without agreement on what constituted a real 
threat to its new sovereignty.90  A new threat emerged from the nonexistent arms control 
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treaties of the former Soviet Republics.  Of particular concern was the lack of administration 
or control of nuclear weapons that covered the Black Sea on the part of Poland’s neighbors 
(i.e. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus).91  In addition, without agreements on arms control, the 
prospect of an increase in conventional forces or in nuclear proliferation further complicated 
Poland’s threat perception.  A new strategic concept was initiated in 1997 in concert with a 
newer NATO strategy, as Poland’s accession to NATO was becoming a reality. 
  Poland’s foreign affairs did not exhibit any policies of the type Dmowski’s camp 
espoused; instead, it reinvigorated Pi!sudski’s embrace of the West.  Public surveys 
conducted in Poland on NATO membership indicated by a large percentage were in favor of 
joining the Alliance (83 percent supported, 9 percent opposed, and 8 percent had no 
opinion).">  Poland eventually became a NATO member in March of 1999 but continued to 
hold an autonomous strategy.   
  The Polish government was waiting for Washington’s approval on a concept of 
NATO’s new strategy, in order to revise Polish strategy. Andrzej Olechowski, who had 
served as Foreign Minister, commented that Poland’s membership in the Alliance now made 
his country feel safer, and that, as a result, its security policy could soften up.93  While Polish 
reliance on the Warsaw Pact’s strategy appeared to be similar to its reliance on NATO’s 
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strategy, it was actually quite the opposite: NATO strategy required consensus from its 
members, since individual-state strategy dictated its own security interests.94 
  The 2000 Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland project was approved in the 
Parliament on May 23, 2000.95  The project was produced by the Defense System 
Department of the Minister of Defense (MoD).  The key objective was to combine the 
defense strategy and security agents, which it accomplished by involving the executive 
branch (the President) and the legislative branch (the parliament).  Coordination for defense 
matters occurred between the government and the President, but it had to be approved by the 
parliament.  The defense strategy project was carried out in consultation with the National 
Security Bureau and the ministries.96  
  The new Polish Defense Strategy document was based on the 1997 Polish 
Constitution, which replaced the Small Constitution of 1992, and on other statutes and was 
compliant with the Security Strategy document and NATO’s strategic concept.97  The new 
Polish strategic concept was different than before, as it provided detailed procedures for 
dealing with threats and strategic defense goals, and it included a perspective on defense and 
the political-military agents who with threats.98  
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  This strategic concept substituted “defensive doctrine” for “defense strategy” to 
improve the analysis of state defense, national concerns, critical aims with realistic objectives, 
and the requirements to achieve such objectives.99  Still, such national security strategy 
objectives had to be in compliance with the Polish Constitution’s main principles of security. 
  Poland’s security policy protected the homeland and provided for the welfare of the 
people.  The policy coincides with the Constitution, but most importantly, it details the “basic 
tenants…from values and principles [that are] laid down.”100 The Polish constitution gives 
the President, in consultation with the Prime minister or Council of Ministers, the executive 
power to participate in “military conflict or to reinforce the forces of the state or the allied 
countries [and] peace mission, actions aiming at preventing the acts of terror or the results 
thereof.”101  Similarly, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2007) 
provides the foundation, framework, and objectives for the Defense Strategy of the Republic 
of Poland (2009).102 
  Poland’s national security improved as a new legal framework encouraged agency 
cooperation among the political institutions. The president of Poland was the primary actor in 
determining the National Security Strategy per the Polish Constitution, but he or she would 
now do so in conjunction with the Prime Minster, and the Council of Ministers; together they 
would produce under Article 4a, Clause 1 of the Polish Constitution “the Political and 
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Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland and other executive documents for the 
national security strategy…”103 Pursuant to Art. 4a, Clause 1 of the Act, the President shall: 
“approve, on the application of the Prime Minister, the national security strategy; issue, on 
the application of the Prime Minister, by decision, the Political and Strategic Defense 
Directive of the Republic of Poland and other executive documents for the national security 
strategy; approve, on the application of the Council of Ministers.”104  The democratic notion 
of sharing decision-making through the government executive agencies was emphasized in 
the Polish Constitution and reflected in the aforementioned strategic documents.  These 
changes in the constitution highlighted the differences between the communist era and the 
democratic institutions that took root after communism. 
 
Poland’s Generational Gap 
  A generational gap is evident between the old post-communist Wa!#sa government 
and today’s Komorowski political leadership.  During the first elected Wa!#sa government in 
1990, leftist activists, even remnants of the communist leadership, opposed the idea that 
NATO would be an element of Poland’s national security strategy.105  According to Marek 
Jan Chodakiewicz, the path to NATO was viewed as a decade of political turmoil.  “As late 
as March 1991, the top military brass, all former Communists, touted the idea of ‘armed 
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neutrality’ (zbrojna neutralnosc), Chodakiewicz writes, with the then-President Lech 
Walesa's idea of a ‘NATO-bis,’ or a shadow NATO, for East Central Europe.”106   
  The majority of today’s Polish political elite opposed the communist party during the 
1981 Solidarity (Solidarno"#) movement; Bronis!aw Komorowski (the President of Poland), 
Jacek Micha!owski (the Head of the Chancellery) Krzysztof Hubert $aszkiewicz (the 
Secretary of State), Professor Roman Ku"niar (political advisor), and other members of the 
current government participated in anti-communist activities by working “underground” and 
by being imprisoned during and after the martial law period (1981-83).107  Whether pro-
Western or communist political philosophy influences Polish security strategy in the future is 
another concern, but the safeguarding of Polish territory is, for now, a “Constitutional 
obligation and duty stemming from the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) ratified by the Republic 
of Poland.”108 
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CHAPTER VII:  
POLAND’S DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO 
 
The Benefits of NATO Membership 
  In an interview with the Minister of National Defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, a Warsaw 
Business Journal reporter asked whether Poland’s security depends on an Alliance or on the 
Polish armed forces.  Siemoniak replied that Poland cannot defend itself without NATO, 
hence on its own  
…defense autarky” is not an option for us…. [since such a military capability] is not 
affordable – and not necessary…. We use NATO as a system that connects allies’ forces 
and makes them much more effective and cheaper.109 
 
 The last Polish Defense Strategy was published in 2009.   Since then, the 2008 world 
economic crisis, a challenging war in Afghanistan, and a new US strategy aimed at 
stabilizing relations in Asia have raised European security concerns.  At the same time, 
debates about whether the retraction of American commitments to the Alliance could impact 
NATO’s strategic capabilities have made Poland’s political elite worried.  This ongoing 
debate has also created another security concern or threat to Poland’s security interests, 
which in turn affects Poland’s national security.  In spite of such concerns, however, Poland 
continues to receive three chief security benefits that are the main attributes of hard power: 
air policing, the NATO Response Force, and Air Defense.
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First, NATO’s air policing provides a guarantee to safeguard Poland’s territory and its 
allies by air.  Air policing is carried out on a rotational basis, where NATO members provide 
their national assets to undertake the air policing missions.  Rotations are made by different 
members of the Alliance, and the process involves four aircraft with a crew of anywhere 
from fifty to one hundred personnel.  The rotations cover the airspaces above Albania, 
Slovenia, Iceland, the Baltic States, and recently, separate bilateral agreements have led to 
patrolling above the Southeastern European region, i.e. the Balkans, Romania, Albania, Italy 
and Greece.110 Newly acquired fighter-aircraft such as the Eurofighter, the F-16 Falcon, or 
older ones like the F-4F Phantom or the MiG 29 can be utilized for this purpose.111  Because 
of defense cuts, however, air policing missions such as these could be in jeopardy in the near 
future.  A lack of air policing would mean that Poland would not be able to cover its own 
regional airspace or to help its neighbors, since the Polish Air Force will not have NATO 
resources, namely fighter aircraft or money to continue its policing.  
The responsibility for air policing is outlined in the role of the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SHAPE), who provides a twenty-four hour air defense and air 
surveillance that also serves as an early warning system for a quick reaction alert force.112  
Poland has already participated in four air policing rotations, the last of which was carried 
out on April 2012 by the Polish Military Contingent (ORLIK 4).113  The future of such air 
policing is at risk, however, since European budgets continue to decline and aircraft usage is 
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costly.  Central Eastern European (CEEs) states like Slovakia cannot afford to replace their 
old MiG29 fleet, and the Baltic States depend on NATO members for their air policing.114  
Second, under NATO’s Article 5, Poland’s territory is protected by NATO’s response 
force (NRF).  Defense against armed aggression would constitute the use of NRF by 
deploying a lethal show of military force and executing different types of missions.  If an 
overwhelming threat should emerge, Poland’s national military capabilities could be 
augmented using NATO’s immediate response force (IRF).  Additional assigned elements of 
land, maritime, combat air support, and special forces totaling to 13,000 or more troops could 
also be provided at anywhere from forty-eight hours to a thirty day notice.115  The types of 
security threats that the response force is capable of combating correspond to the current 
security environment, per NATO’s strategic concept. 
NATO’s capabilities are not exclusively for responding to security threats that could 
arise in Poland.  For instance, NATO’s military assets are also capable of maintaining 
Poland’s territorial sovereignty by a show of force, conducting security and peace operations, 
performing initial entry, guarding essential national resources, and providing emergency 
relief in the case of disaster.116  There are also no constraints over force generation or 
logistical requirements that could arise in a prolonged conflict.  The NATO response force in 
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recent years, however, has been criticized for its ability and capacity to conduct military 
operations. 
As an agile weapon of NATO, NRF is the solution to “911” calls made in case of an 
armed attack on Polish territory.  A study of NATO response forces by the Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy of National Defense University (NDU) in 2005 
examined the limitations to the capabilities of the Alliance prior to commissioning of the 
NATO response forces.117  NATO’s capabilities for coalition technology and information 
sharing were the main objects of study, and the resulting report focused primarily on the 
three phases by which the response forces would conduct military operations.  While the US 
military would provide the majority of the capabilities (known as enablers), the European 
would soon follow with their own arsenal, produced by the European defense industry.  The 
push for European allies to develop airlift, mobility, missile defense, and precision striking 
capabilities was a requirement that ought to have occurred within a specific time frame.  To 
date, however, little progress has been made.118 
Since NATO’s response force would assign forces on a rotational basis, the burden of 
generating needed forces would not rest on Poland’s shoulders.  Instead, it would be provided 
through a response forces pool mechanism and sustained by a joint logistics support group 
headquarters.119  In order to ensure that these military forces are adequately certified to 
deploy at a moments notice, they are assigned to military headquarters commands (HQs) for 
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command and control.120  This illustrates how the Alliance has set standards to ensure that its 
state members are not only NATO interoperable, but also tactical and technologically 
capable of conducting operations. Supporting such missions, however, requires military 
hardware that is available through the “pool” of the Alliance. 
The pool provides distinct capabilities and military hardware that are dramatically more 
powerful than Poland’s own assets.  For instance, AWACS aircraft are resourced and 
operated through partnerships, allowing allies to have greater access to such capabilities at a 
much more reasonable shared cost.121  In addition to utilizing NATO shared assets in normal 
or routine operations, these assets can also be deployed in special missions.  For example, 
upon activation of an intermediate response force, two deployable operating bases and one 
aerial port of debarkation could provide sixteen fighter/air defense aircraft, four combat 
search-and-rescue aircraft, six reconnaissance aircraft, six unmanned aerial vehicles, three 
airborne early warning aircraft, one electronic countermeasures aircraft, and two air-to-air 
refueling aircraft.122  As these capabilities demonstrate, NATO augments dramatically the 
two tactical air wings and the one air transport wing of the Polish air force.123 
Third, Poland also depends on NATO for an integrated missile defense system, which 
the Alliance was able to acquire in 2010 in a form of a ballistic missile defense capability.124 
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The Alliance recognized the need for a more capable European theater missile shield, one 
able to deter weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile warheads.  A comprehensive 
theater missile shield is, in a sense, an active layered theater ballistic missile defense 
(ALTBMD) that provides low- and high-altitude protection by deterring short- and medium-
range ballistic missile threats.  The Obama administration has been committed to European 
security and provides an Aegis ballistic missile defense capability comprised of four US 
naval warships with advanced radar and target weaponry (which are able to engage ballistic 
missile threats).  These come in addition to four frigates from the Netherlands and early 
warning defense capabilities from France.125  Other members of the Alliance like Poland, 
Romania, and Turkey have also agreed to be [art of the ballistic missile defense; Poland and 
Romania serve as the base location for US SM-3 interceptors and Turkey provides a radar 
capability. 
In addition to an integrated missile defense system, NATO provides Poland with a 
strategic airlift capability.  Airlift capability is an important asset in moving military troops 
and their equipment quickly obviating reliance on other sources of transportation (e.g. ground 
or sea).  In NATO missions, the goal has been to move light forces in an expedient manner in 
order to make effective use of deadly force against an armed aggressor.126  Airlift is an 
expeditionary, or out-of-area operations, requirement, and the United States has always had 
the foundation and industry to support it.  Indeed, the heavy military hardware demands 
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Missile Defense. (n.d.). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm 
 
125 As a communications system by means of command, control, and communication (referred to as ‘C3’), 
ALTBMD provides a coverage beyond Europe’s geographical location in relation to its outside borders. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm 
 
126 Vlachos-Dengler, Katia. (2007). Carry That Weight Improving European Strategic Airlift Capabilities. 
Doctoral Dissertation. Pardee RAND Graduate School:1;3-4 
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aircraft capabilities that only the United States could provide to its allies.127  The Polish 
military can utilize such NATO assets to support various national and NATO-based missions. 
Poland benefits from NATO’s strategic airlift resources not only by saving direct 
maintenance-related costs per flight hour, but also because it allows them to take an active 
role in NATO missions.  For example, the current purchase of three C-17 Globemaster IIIs 
(cargo and transport aircraft) remains NATO’s largest aircraft, capable of handling170,900 
pounds with a range of 2,400 nautical miles.  They are able to make multiple missions from 
heavy military hardware to airdrops of airborne units.  A Heavy Airlift Wing based in 
Hungary’s Papa Air Base, this strategic airlift capability required participating nations to 
combine their resources for ownership, operation, and maintenance of the C-17 Globemaster 
IIIs.128   
Another resource of NATO’s strategic airlift is an interim solution, which \ involves a 
conglomerate of NATO nations that have contracted the Antonov Airlines’ (An-124-100) 
transport aircraft.129  However, a plethora of issues has plagued the process of adapting a 
multinational (universal) lift capabilities model by all the members of the Alliance.  Each 
member of the Alliance has its own national security strategy that is driven by national 
interests.  Yet, relying on others to carry out missions for national security is, in some ways, 
akin to relinquishing the authority of state sovereignty.  Burden-sharing activities are also a 
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128 The SAC is different than ordinary NATO functions of command in that not all of the alliance has an 
agreement to SAC, hence operation of this aircraft is determined by a United States Air Force general officer 
through a steering committee.  A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is made through the US government’s 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program with the partnering nations that own the three aircraft. Maintenance is 
contracted through Boeing and flight hours are determined for each nation according to contribution. See 
Strategic Airlift Capability. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm 
 
129 Ibid 
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subject of national debate in European governments, and they have become an obstacle for 
NATO in achieving organizational efficiency.130 
 
The Latest Challenges for NATO  
 The anticipated decline of NATO benefits raises concerns for Poland’s political elite. 
From the Polish elites’ perspective, the future of NATO as a security organization appears 
uncertain, a perception that has been reinforced by empty promised made by the Alliance at 
its summits, the most recent of which was the Chicago NATO Summit 2012.  The NATO 
strategic concept is in danger of failing to fulfill its commitments, which could detriment its 
ability to provide an adequate security umbrella. 
 Unfortunately, neither Poland’s foreign policy objectives nor tireless efforts on the 
part of diplomatic multi-defense initiatives can persuade other NATO members to increase 
military spending. Current data on the military spending of NATO members indicate a 
widening gap in European security.  NATO’s two percent target in defense spending from its 
members might serve as a valuable measuring tool, but it has no affect on the spending 
behavior of its members.131  Though influential members of the Alliance like Germany and 
the United Kingdom have and continue to reduce their military expenditures, Poland and 
France have not.  The middle sized EU countries have, on average, cut their defense budgets 
by10-15 percent, while smaller countries have cut as much as 20 percent.132 
 A close examination on the allies’ defense expenditures as a percentage of gross 
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131 Scars, scares and scarcity; defence spending in eastern Europe (2011) The Economist (US); 66 
 
132 O’Donnell, Marina C.et al. (2012). Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's 
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domestic product (GDP) over a twenty-year period from 1990 to 2011 suggests trouble for 
NATO defense spending, especially in the last five years (see Table 1, Defense Expenditures 
as a Percentage of GDP).133 Only the past five years of defense GDP expenditures have been 
analyzed to demonstrate the impact of the world economic crisis on defense spending (see 
chart/bar-graph 1 on Defense GDP Expenditures from 2007-11).  Data demonstrates that 
Germany and the United Kingdom are fairly stable in defense spending, though the United 
Kingdom commits more of its budget to defense than Germany.  France has historically 
committed at the same level as the United Kingdom, but these expenditures seem to be 
dropping. 
 While some European states like Poland, Estonia, France, Germany, and United 
Kingdom do not indicate a dramatic increase or decrease in defense spending (see figure 1), 
these European states do not have sufficient funding for military capabilities needed in the 
near future.  For example, Germany’s spending on defense showed a 0.1 percent increase 
from 2008 to 2009, but this level has remained steady since; the United Kingdom, a strong 
US ally, increased funding by 0.2 percent from 2007 to 2008, but then increased only by 0.1 
percent before dropping back down to 2008 levels.  France’s commitment level has dropped 
steadily by a rate of 0.1 percent over the last three years, while Poland has increased or 
decreased by no more than 0.2 percent of a difference without falling below the 1.8% 
national mandate on GDP defense expenditures (see Table 1).134  The United States, the 
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133 Refer to Table 1. Gross domestic product (GDP) and defense expenditures annual percentage change (%).  
See NATO Diplomacy Division (2012) Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense.  
Communique PR/CP(2012)047-REV1(5) 
 
134 Refer to Table 1. Beginning with Germany (discussing only the second decade – i.e. from 2000-2011) 
defense expenditures had a gap in the two (average) periods (2000-2004 and 2005-2009) that accounted for (an 
average GDP) drop by 0.1 percent (from 1.4 percent to 1.3 percent).  However, from 2009 to 2011 (on an 
annual basis) the percentage in GDP remained the same at 1.4 percent.  In France the average for the first 
average period (accounting for the same years) was at 2.5 percent, while at the second period was at 2.3 percent 
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largest NATO contributor, had also seen both an increase and a decrease in defense spending 
over the past five years owing to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic crisis, 
which resulted in a multi-trillion dollar budget deficit.  As a result, between 2010 and 2011, 
US spending on defense dropped an entire percent.  Nevertheless, at 4.8 percent spending in 
2011, the US budget was $731 billon dollars, far surpassing the $282 billion budget of 
NATO-Europe (see Table 2).135 
 Other members of the Alliance, like the Baltic States and the Eastern European 
Central States have cut their defense budgets substantially.  Poland saw a drop in its defense 
expenditures by .3 percent in 2008, which could have occurred in response to the world 
economic crisis.136 However, Poland’s defense expenditures went back up in 2009 and have 
since have remained at 1.7 or 1.8 percent.   There are no indications that Poland will reduce 
substantially its defense budget, instead, it will likely increase spending to support its own 
defense industry and to modernize its military capabilities.  Smaller NATO members like 
Lithuania and Latvia have reduced defense spending by more than 20 percent, while a large 
number of medium-sized states like Ireland, Romania, and the Czech Republic have reduced 
by between 10 and 15 percent.137 The total contributions of the smaller countries in NATO 
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(a 0.2 percent drop).  From 2009 to 2011, on an annual basis it was uneven spending at 2.1 percent, 2.0 percent, 
and 1.9 percent respectively. United Kingdom, a strong US ally was at the same two average periods (2000-
2004 and 2005-2009) at 2.3 percent and 2.5 percent (a 0.2 percent increase), while at an annual basis from 2009 
to 2011 it was at 2.7 percent the both first years and a decrease of 0.1 percent at 2.6 at the last year. The United 
States for the same average periods was at 3.3 percent and 3.4 percent (an increase of 0.1 percent) and on 
annual basis at 5.4 percent for the first two years, but dropped at 4.8 percent the last year (a whole 1.0 percent) 
of a difference.   Even though this 1.0 percent has a lot to do with the economic crisis that continuous to 
severely affect the US economy, United States alone surpasses the spending of its allies.  Ibid., 5 
 
135 Ibid., 4 
 
136 Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries. See NATO Diplomacy Division (2012) Financial and Economic 
Data Relating to NATO Defence Communique PR/CP(2012)047-REV1. (4) 
 
137 O’Donnell, Marina C.et al. (2012). Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's 
largest members. 30; 6. Center of the United States and Europe, Brookings 
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do not make a substantial difference to the Alliance’s military capabilities. When considering 
the entire spectrum of NATO operations in Afghanistan, these members contribute 
significantly; however they represent only a very small fraction of NATO aggregate forces.  
Other than Poland, the Baltic states and the rest of the Eastern and Central European states 
are beneficial to NATO because of their Special Forces. 
 Changes in European defense spending will undoubtedly impact the Alliance as a 
whole.  NATO members will not be able to conduct routine operations like Baltic Air 
Policing.  NRF capabilities could be reduced, as the Alliance would not be able to commit 
either their forces or assets in a crisis situation.  There would also be limited strategic airlift 
or sealift capacities, which would compromise power projection capabilities.  Funding for 
training would be impacted, and military cooperation would not be as effective. 
 If the US were to reduce defense spending in Europe, than Poland’s security would be 
affected.  America’s allies still depend on its power projection capabilities (ballistic missile 
submarines, strategic airlift, the aircraft carrier strike group, amphibious and airborne forces, 
forward basing, etc.) to carry out NATO missions.  These include the missile defense 
initiative referred to as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that will provide a 
comprehensive Aegis missile defense system able to deter a ballistic missile threat. 
 America still sees its military and political presence as vital to protecting US interests.  
Continued defense spending in Europe is evidence that US remains committed to European 
security regardless of a military “pivot” toward Asia. In a budget request overview for fiscal 
year (FY) 2013, it was stated that, “the U.S. will maintain our Article 5 commitments to 
allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations…. 
[while the] Emphasis is to build the capacity of partners and allies to defend their own 
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territory and interests.”138 
 In another official budget summary document for FY 2013, planned support for 
activities in Europe included $800 million for combatant commanders to spend on exercises 
and engagement activities, $400 million to spend on security assistance, and $200 million to 
be used for ground surveillance.139  Regarding military construction projects in Europe as 
part of the NATO Security Investment Program, a FY 2013 justification data report on 
military construction projects indicates that, “the U.S. has an abiding national security 
interest in a stable, integrated European Region…. [and] from a strategic standpoint, NATO 
is the only forum enabling the U.S. and its European Allies to consult and develop common 
views and solutions to security challenges, not only in Europe, but also on a global scale.”140 
 The reorientation toward Asia noted on the FY 2013 budget request does not indicate 
a great difference in spending in comparison with the budget for Europe in support of NATO.  
However, the budget for Asian spending suggests that upgrades in military technology will 
be used as deterrents in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations.  A US defense budget 
summary report for FY 2013 in support of Asian-Pacific and Middle East objectives showed 
investments of $1.8 billion on electronic equipment (tactical and warfare), $300 million on 
designing the future bomber, and $100 million on adding missile capacity in future Virginia-
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class submarines.141  
 
Future NATO Challenges  
There will be a significant decrease in European military capabilities, widening the gap 
between the US and Europe.  At the last Chicago summit, European leaders announced 
officially that they pledged to pool and share their resources in keeping with the “Smart 
Defense” concept known as NATO Forces 2020. However, NATO skeptics are debating 
whether such defense initiatives will, in fact, come to fruition, since European governments 
continue to reduce their defense budgets at an alarming rate. 
The United Kingdom is decreasing its defense budget and might be losing its political-
military influence in the global scene.  The United Kingdom will have fewer Maritime and 
Air Force capabilities; in order to implement savings after operations in Afghanistan, the 
United Kingdom plans to reduce its military contributions to overseas operations during 
times of peace except in the case of emergencies. In 2010, official sources had indicated a 7.5 
percent reduction in the defense budget for the 2010-2014 period, but in actuality this 
reduction has been closer to 25 percent.  This unexpected drop in the UK’s defense budget 
occurred because the Department of Defense presumed that the Treasury Department would 
pay for certain defense programs; the last administration overspent its defense budget, and 
the current administration was forced to make further budget cuts.142 Cutbacks in personnel 
and naval military hardware from ships to fighter aircraft will diminish Naval capabilities 
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overall.143 Army and Air Force cutbacks on personnel and hardware will also impact the 
United Kingdom’s operational outreach.144 
France has remained steady in terms of defense expenditures and will increase spending 
on research and development.  France has not reduced its military acquisitions, as it 
continues to protect its own security by procuring hardware. 
Germany will be decreasing the defense budget by reducing personnel and military 
hardware. Germany plans to transition to a totally voluntary force and to cut its forces 
significantly. The goal will be to pressure the defense industry into cutting the price of 
military hardware instead of retracting from purchases by paying fines. Germany might also 
sell its tanks or decrease the number of tanks in the force.145 
NATO’s pooling and sharing initiatives are a response to national defense budget cuts, 
and they are a clear indication that European national governments have abandoned their 
commitments to NATO’s collective security.  This neglect and these continued reductions in 
military spending result from the US’s ongoing commitment to NATO.  The US military 
presence in Europe during the Cold War and afterwards created many savings for European 
defense budgets. A recent NDU study indicated that NATO’s poorer members take 
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still in service, the lessening down to three ships (destroyer and frigates), or the replacement of aging fighter 
aircraft with new ones (the Harrier jet was discontinued, procurement delays with the variant of the Joint Strike 
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144 These cutbacks include personnel in the Army (more than 22,000 by 2020), decreasing the amount of the 
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advantage of NATO members with a higher GDP.146  This is evidenced by the fact that a 
large number of members, particularly in the West, exploit their access to NATO security 
without sharing much of the burden.  The fault lies in the common belief that the United 
States can provide security for Europe, since it is wealthier than its allies. 
For example, knowing that the US has more military capabilities, forces, and assets, as 
well as the highest percentage of defense-related GDP expenditures in NATO has set a 
precedent.  In addition, NATO is an American creation that has been led by a dual-headed 
US commander who is responsible both for NATO and for the United States European 
Command (USEUCOM).  Hence, knowing that a US commander will always be “at the helm” 
of NATO means that there is no incentive for European militaries to spend on defense.  The 
majority of the Alliance members in Europe worry only about the internal/state security 
issues.  
The only defense spending that NATO European members are willing to make is on 
internal/state security. The only time that members of the Alliance seem willing to spend is 
when it involves the territorial security of their borders, including the threat of terrorism.147 
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CHAPTER VIII: 
POLAND’S SECURITY BENEFITS 
 
How NATO Benefits from Poland 
 Does Poland benefit as a member of the Alliance from sending troops to 
Afghanistan?  Some members of NATO, including Poland, feel that contributing to 
dangerous operations abroad is to their advantage, while other allies, like Germany, feel the 
opposite (i.e., they notice a loss of public support).  The waxing and waning of public support 
for the war in Afghanistan has a bearing on governments’ decisions when deciding whether 
to make mission-related contributions.  In one recent 2012 US transatlantic trends survey, the 
George Marshall fund indicated that the German public favored the complete redeployment 
of troops to Germany at 53 percent, while Poland stood at 62 percent--even higher than 
expected.148 While Poland’s public opinion is not really a surprise, one would ask why the 
Polish government persists in supporting the Alliance in such a committed way. 
 Poland’s defense budget supports a military force of 120,000 troops, which is 
comprised of a large Army and Air Force, a relatively small Navy, and the other military 
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Departments.149  Poland continues to professionalize its non-conscript military forces and 
modernize its armament primarily through capital investment by having a strong bilateral 
relationship with the United States.  Not surprisingly, the Polish Ministry of Defense has 
adapted the US military chain structure (J/G-1 thru J/G-6) making it compatible with NATO 
doctrine. 
 While there are too many external variables to calculate the cost of NATO 
contributions against the benefits of NATO security (including the status of the economy, the 
size and modernization of military forces, and political influence (soft power) within the 
Alliance), political and economic risks overall determine members’ contributions to NATO.  
The not-so wealthy states, called the “upper-middle-income economies” members of NATO, 
such as Poland and Romania, take the “hard” combat missions in Afghanistan, in comparison 
to wealthier members that are classified as “high-income economies” like the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France.150  Although Poland and Romania contribute more troops 
and take on more dangerous missions than Germany or Italy, because of their economic 
status and status as relative NATO newcomers, they do not carry as much soft power in the 
North Atlantic Council as other countries. 
 Collective security guarantees are viewed in Polish strategic culture as questionable, 
if not outright suspect, and they are an element of consideration when Poland drafts its 
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national security strategy.  The former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ Brussels 
speech on June 10, 2011, argued that NATO members who share the burden in combat 
missions and those that do not.  Specifically, he pointed out that NATO has transformed into 
what appears to be as  
…a two-tiered Alliance between members who specialize in “soft” humanitarian, 
development, peacekeeping and talking tasks and those conducting the “hard” combat 
missions -- between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of 
Alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership, be they 
security guarantees or headquarters billets, but don’t want to share the risks and the 
costs.151 
 
This observation confirms that free riding is negatively affecting burden-sharing, which 
paints NATO as a weak coalition. 
! Poland is quite aware that its security measures must be spread among multiple 
security alliances, rather than relying solely on NATO. The hard truth is that if Poland wants 
to remain relevant in world affairs, then the United States must be included in its security 
equation. Polish national security has to satisfy its strategic security requirements by aligning 
with a powerful nuclear alliance (like NATO) or, bilaterally, with the United States. Polish 
diplomats must do everything in their capacity to persuade their European counterparts to 
remain committed to NATO and to its purpose.  The negative consequences of a weak 
Alliance means that Europe will not have “smart power,” a mix of soft and hard power that is 
influential on the world stage.  This will reduce its influence in world affairs.  The United 
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States remains a smart power that continues to prove itself through advances in every field, 
making its hard power (military superiority) a force that is unstoppable.152 
 
Can NATO Benefits Impact Poland’s Security? 
 A drastic change in NATO commitments, primarily the withdrawal of American 
hegemony would create a void in Poland’s security. Polish defense strategy is determined 
based on military capabilities that the United States provides to NATO.  As the White House 
announced its 2012 strategic guidance in the beginning of the year, the Polish government 
became increasingly worried about the future of NATO.  If the US were to direct its strategic 
capability elsewhere (like in Asia), this would hinder NATO’s ability to provide a security 
umbrella for Europe.  
 A decreasing US military presence in Europe, and the reduction of US military forces 
following the end of the Cold War, is a cause for alarm that has been ignored by many 
European governments.  The ongoing European “free-rider” problem within NATO, where 
Europe relies on the United States to protect its security, has been discussed by many US 
administrations since the end of the Cold War.  NATO’s European members will continue to 
abstain from increasing their military capabilities to a strategic level as long as the United 
States continues its military presence in Europe.  The European countries have been using 
political rhetoric to maintain good US-European relations that work to their benefit while 
saving by reducing their defense expenditures.153 Conversely, US planning on a Brigade 
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Combat Team (BCT) decrease in Europe would be a reason for the Polish government to rely 
on a US-strategic partnership, as a guarantee for US military assistance in Poland.   
 For more than a decade, Polish diplomats and politicians have pushed for a 
comprehensive European security strategy in an effort to prevent a NATO capabilities gap.  
Such concern suggests that there is dissatisfaction in the area of security.  The ongoing issue 
of European states spending less on security and devoting greater attention to economic 
problems translates to weaker security for Poland.  Further, the current military obligations of 
the Alliance to EU defense characterize the unwillingness of state governments to continue to 
pursue open-ended defense policies. 
 European defense ministers have also identified the gap in European security as a 
source of concern, as US strategy is diverting US military assets to Asia. The former Armed 
Forces Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Nick Harvey, on a security forum in Singapore, 
mentioned that America's repositioning of its naval assets to Asia would create a void in 
NATO capabilities. Harvey mentioned that his country is not able to fill such a void, even 
though America expects the Europeans to do so.  According to Harvey, Europe has not taken 
any action.  He notes that, if “we're back in the carrier strike game we could pull more weight, 
[but] if Europe is to take more responsibility, we've got some way to go.”154 
 Army leaders in Europe would also feel a diminishing western influence should 
military forces move out from European soil. Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, former Commander of 
US Army Europe, has also voiced his concerns to the US secretary of the Army on a trip to 
Ukraine.  When Hertling was asked about the status of the Ukrainian Army, he replied that 
there were many problems including the Army’s leadership’s tendency towards an old-style 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154Benitez, J. (2012, June 4). Britain fears NATO military gaps after US shift to Asia. Atlantic Council. 
http://www.acus.org 
 
!!
;"!
Soviet model.  He added that, if US-Ukrainian military cooperation disintegrated, things 
could be even worse.155 
 However, there are European leaders who recognize the need for America to carry out 
its strategic objectives in Asia and conclude, therefore, that Europeans should take over the 
American responsibility for protecting Europe.  Secretary of State for Defense Phillip 
Hammond provoked members of the Alliance by saying that “the European NATO powers 
should welcome the fact that the US is willing to engage in this new strategic challenge on 
behalf of the Alliance…. [and] as a result, European nations, including the UK, will need to 
do much more of the heavy lifting in the security of their own region.”156 
 
Polish and American Benefits from a US-Polish Strategic Relationship 
 The US-Polish defense relationship has been linear, meaning that it has a history of 
good relations.  The Polish defense strategy relies on a US-Polish strategic commitment; such 
a commitment is outlined in the Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2009), which 
notes that the “strategic partnership with the United States of America demonstrably 
enhances Poland’s security.”157  Similarly, Polish military capacity benefits the United States 
substantially when conducting military operations abroad.  Poland supported the Bush 
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administration in the war in Iraq by sending 1,700 troops in 2004, while Germany and France 
did not send any.158   
 According to the US Department of State, Poland is ranked fifth in its troop 
contributions to the war in Afghanistan, and it continues to lead military operations in the 
Ghazni Province.159  Poland is also the only country in Europe that does not have caveats in 
the Afghanistan mission: the Polish soldier fights next to the American soldier and risks 
his/her life in dangerous operations.  ISAF pre-deployment training requires 2,600 Polish 
troops (deployed in the theater of operations) to conduct exercises with their American 
counterparts from US Army Europe, the Illinois National Guard, and the Special Operations 
Command. The Declaration on Strategic Cooperation (signed on August 2008) made the 
Polish-US bilateral pact even stronger by offering military training and modernizing 
equipment, sharing intelligence, conducting research and development, and continuing to 
work on the missile defense treaty.160  
 The US-Polish relationship has endured primarily because of US foreign policy 
objectives that go beyond Poland’s security aspirations.  The US-Polish strategic agreement 
on a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) platform in Poland relies on Russia’s willingness to 
support the US through U.N. sanctions against Iran and by preventing the sale of a strategic 
air defense system (S-300) to Iran.161  As a response, the Polish government has taken steps 
to ensure that Poland’s security doesn’t fall short using its extensive foreign US relations.  
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The top leadership of the United States and Poland, President Obama and President 
Komorowski, in Warsaw in 2011, agreed to move forward with stationing a US Air Force 
Detachment (comprised of F-16s and C-130 aircraft) in Poland.  On the topic of missile 
defense, both presidents and the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, ratified the Missile 
Defense Agreement (May 2011) for the EPAA, calling it “a new approach to ballistic missile 
defense in Europe.”162 Recently, however, President Komorowski made an announcement 
that Poland would better benefit if it had its own BMD capabilities instead of purchasing 
American SM-3 interceptors.163  This public announcement hints that Poland’s real priority 
might be building its defense industry as the country continuous to grow economically. 
 There seems to be a correlation between the demand for military supplies and 
increasing profits in the defense industry. The defense budget doubled after 9-11, as America 
's military forces demanded the best equipment to fight their wars abroad.164 The mass 
production of defense equipment during World War II (WWII) was diverted to the private 
sector after the war by focusing on technology as a means to meet the demands of the 
military.165 
 Even in terms of domestic politics there are divergent interests within the government, 
particularly in high positions such as ministers. One such instance occurred when President 
Komorowski and the Minister of Defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, were reported as having 
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opposite views on where the Polish military was headed: Komorowski named missile defense 
as a national priority, while Siemoniak’s deputy, Vice-Minister Waldemar Skrzypczak (in 
charge of armaments), indicated armor vehicles as being the national priority.166 Even though, 
in an interview on August 14, 2011, Siemoniak took a different stance than his deputy and 
agreed with Komorowski on armament priorities, a reporter noted in a sarcastic tone that, “I 
could not imagine that a few weeks from taking over a position in the MoD anyone would 
decide about spending several hundred million without previously conducting detailed 
analysis.”167  
 In a meeting held on September 12, 2012, the Polish president, along with his prime 
minister and other government officials, discussed the development of an anti-missile 
defense system as part of Poland’s air defense strategy. The head of the BBN, Stanis!aw 
Koziej, as well as the minister of defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, spoke to the current problems 
with Poland’s Air Defense System.  The inclusion of anti-missile defense provisions within 
the framework of the Polish air defense system was a government compromise: it resulted 
from a shared decision by the president and his government.  The proposal of a new Polish 
missile defense was necessitated by operational requirements in the categories of safety and 
territorial defense, as well as by the conditions set on the members of the Alliance (the 
realization of a NATO decision undertaking at the summit in Chicago concerning building a 
NATO-wide system). The problem, however, was that in order to acquire an anti-missile 
defense system, there would have to be an amendment to the 2001 law/act that sets fiscal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Ma!ecki, P. (2012, September 9). Conflict between the MoD and the President? Retrieved from 
http://www.defence24.com/ 
 
167 Ibid 
 
!!
<%!
limits in the restructuring and technical modernization of Poland’s military forces.168 
 Komorowski mentioned that it was a source of personal satisfaction and that is 
guaranteed a means to finance the modernization of arms at a level that enables the 
realization of big programs including that of multirole combat aircraft, the program of 
circular armored personnel carrier, or the armor-piercing rocket program.  He also added that 
Poland would be perceived as a country with clout within the Alliance and one capable of 
private territory defense.169 
 It was noted, however, that there could be political obstacles that could prevent 
legislation for an anti-missile defense system. Komorowski mentioned that, in his opinion, 
“the project amendment of the law would be a good occasion to cue discussion on the theme 
of prospective defense and capability to cooperation in this area of different political 
strengths.”170  At the same time, he expressed interest in recreating an environment similar to 
2001, in which party politics were overcome to facilitate discussions concerning the safety of 
Poland and future decisions.  To achieve this goal, the head of BBN proposed a conversation 
and consultation on the basis of merit from representatives of all branches of parliament.171 
 The top Polish National Security Advisor, Professor Roman Kuzniar, in an interview 
with Pawel Wronski, a reporter from the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper, made public his belief 
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that Poland’s reliance on the US for security was the wrong strategy.172 Kuzniar mentions 
that it is the combination of EU, NATO, and Polish military capabilities that protects 
Poland’s security.  While the United States compliments NATO’s security, a US-Polish 
defense relationship alone is not adequate to keep Poland secure.173 A proponent of EU 
security, Kuzniar believes that European security support will emerge once EU leaders – 
particularly the French and British– put aside their differences.174 Nonetheless, apart from an 
incomprehensible EU defense policy, Polish security still relies on an American relationship. 
 A US-Polish strategic partnership would provide Poland with a guarantee of security.  
Having some form of US military presence in Poland would place the United States in a 
difficult position.  On one hand, a permanent US military presence in Poland would 
complicate US-Russian relations, since Russia would perceive this as violating the 2+4 
agreement.  On the other hand, Poland would satisfy its security umbrella requirement that 
once was only available through NATO.   
 With this dynamic in mind, the retracting of the US-Poland BMD agreement in 2009 
accounts for Obama’s attempt to reset US-Russian relations.  After the Obama administration 
retracted US President George W. Bush’s 2008 BMD agreement, anxiety spread among the 
Polish political elite.  In response, in July 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
visited Poland to reassure the Polish leadership of a US-Polish strategic partnership.  To this 
day, the US remains Poland’s most powerful ally, and history has demonstrated the success 
of NATO military operations. 
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 America provides a safety net for Poland’s defense strategy because it is a reliable 
entity of NATO.  A case in point is the US’s ability to carry out a deterrence policy that 
outlasted the Cold War.  The Alliance could have difficulties in agreeing on deterrence 
policies towards the Soviet Union, but it always managed to reestablish relationships through 
a commonality principle held together by rules within organization.175  The French decision 
to abandon NATO during de Gaulle’s Presidency in response to the United States not 
supporting a similar Soviet 1964 strategy permitted the Alliance to adopt the strategy of 
flexible response.176  The strength of US foreign policy in NATO, regardless of differences in 
successive US administrations, brought an end to the Cold War.  The collapse of the Soviet 
Union meant that Poland could no longer rely on a weak security structure like the Warsaw 
Pact. 
 NATO nations look to the US for leadership. NATO’s ability to continue after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union was tested during conflicts in the Balkans.  America has 
never abandoned the Alliance, and it even gave NATO a new purpose during the Bosnian 
War.  During the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO illustrated its capabilities by 
reestablishing itself as a real security provider and the only collective security actor in 
Europe.  The Clinton Administration persuaded its allies that intervening in Bosnia and later 
in Kosovo was the solution to ending the war and violence.177  The NATO expression “words 
not deeds” in that NATO’s politicians talk about military action instead of taking action was 
proven to be wrong; NATO’s intervention against the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and 
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the Bosnian Serbs ended the war in socialist Yugoslavia.   The outcome of NATO’s success 
in ending the conflicts in former Yugoslavia reinforced Poland’s ambition in joining the 
Alliance in the post-Cold War period.  However, NATO’s success story in former 
Yugoslavia might not be as compelling in 2012, as other pressing issues have dominated its 
agenda.
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CHAPTER IX: 
A US ASIAN STRATEGY AND A EUROPEAN DILEMMA 
 
 Since the US strategy outlined its security interests with regard to Asia in its 2012 
national strategic document, concerns have been raised regarding the future of the Alliance.  
Meanwhile, as the war in Afghanistan dwindles down, Europeans are looking forward to 
bringing home their troops and to reducing further their military expenditures through 
sharing and pooling initiatives.  Europeans have enjoyed a US security apparatus since the 
end of WWII, but this might soon change.  Western Europeans have benefited from the 
basing of the US military forces in their countries, but the reduction of the US military 
footprint in Europe will leave behind a security vacuum.  How this security vacuum will be 
filled is a source of major concern, particularly for Poland. 
 The United States officially announced in January 2012 that Europeans will be 
providing their own security, but skeptics doubt that Europeans are prepared to handle major 
conflicts in their own backyard.178  In resident Obama’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 
the President emphasized that the US “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific 
region….[while] our posture in Europe must also evolve.”179  Since this document’s official 
publication in January 2012, readers have wondered whether Europe is prepared to take the 
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lead in conducting major military operations in unforeseen conflicts without the US 
assistance.  As a NATO force, the European militaries have been able to take advantage of 
US assets and training when deploying in dangerous locations (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan). 
  Further, European defense is very limited in its military capabilities and is reluctant to 
take another leading role in conducting operations in a civil-war conflict.  A case in point 
was the 2011 French-led NATO air operation (Operation Unified Protector) in Libya.  The 
operation showed that Europe lacks military capabilities, since the US had to provide 
precision-guided munitions, aerial refueling, targeting, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance capabilities (ISR).180  There were also NATO members that did not even 
participate in the operation.  Another stumbling block is that of a complex bureaucracy, 
where NATO members need consensus on the use of military force. 
  What Poland has attempted to accomplish is to patch holes in European security, 
specifically in its own security, by undertaking measures to prevent the consequences of a 
weak Alliance, where too few members would be willing to continue their burden sharing 
commitments after the war in Afghanistan.  According to American security analysts, Poland 
has created a strategic and diverse security approach.  Poland has created a battle group 
through the Visegrad treaty, formed a strategic alliance with Sweden to thwart Russian 
threats, and attempted to build up EU defense through a stronger NATO partnership during 
the EU presidency.181   
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 The Polish attitude toward Europe’s disengagement in its own security may not be 
widely recognized.  Poland’s EU presidency objectives in 2011 for European security 
emphasized the need for EU member states to devote a serious and sustained search  
…for a more systematic and harmonized implementation of CSDP initiatives as 
well as seek for effective partnerships….to take coherent measures if we are to 
yield considerable results from the time, effort and money invested for more than a 
decade.182 
 
 There is no European consensus what should be done to meet current or future 
security challenges. Europeans are still trying to figure out how to restructure the current 
European Defense architecture as the United States refocuses its defense efforts towards Asia.   
With growing concern over the reduction of national defense spending, Europeans have 
looked for ways to combine their resources through pooling and sharing and “Smart Defense” 
(NATO) initiatives.  In debriefing after the NATO summit in Chicago, a panel at the annual 
NATO Brussels Conference placed priority with creating a NATO-China Council (similar to 
the NATO-Russia Council), an industrial EU defense policy, and a public health and 
education arrangement after a post-NATO exit strategy.183  Europeans are trying to figure out 
how to keep NATO intact for their own security, but actions taken by Europe’s national 
governments undermine such aims.   
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 One recent November study on determining shortcoming in US-European defense 
capabilities conducted by the National Defense University identified a wide array of issues 
that European militaries are facing currently.   This study was conducted by interviewing 
defense officials from all over Europe and the United States, and it analyzed the NATO 
Chicago Summit’s NATO Forces 2020 and Smart Defense projects along with the Mission 
Focus Groups (MFGs) concept and by focusing on USEUCOM as the main driver for NATO 
interoperability.184  
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CHAPTER X: 
NATO AND POLAND: LOOKING AHEAD 
 
 The Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has asked the European governments to 
coordinate closer regional security cooperation, but his requests have not been successful.  
Tusk is believed to have steered Poland in the right direction in seeking a more 
comprehensive European security; during the Polish Presidency of the EU Council (where he 
served a term from July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011) Tusk tried his best to strengthen 
European defense cooperation, but was disappointed by the lack of European solidarity on 
defense matters.  The Georgian-Russian war has made Poles overly concerned, appealing to 
NATO for reassurance on collective security.185 
 The Polish leadership has overstretched its efforts to achieve a collective security 
guarantee.  Territorial integrity is an issue that concerns Poland, but often its European 
neighbors have worried that Poland would worsen European relations with Russia.  The 
United States has assisted Poland by strengthening military-to-military cooperation, but has 
not based a military force in Poland.  The Poles still are concerned that one day they will be a 
victim of Russia, just like Georgian was in the Georgian-Russian war.186 
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From the Polish elite perspective, Russia disapproves the Eastern partnership program’s 
objectives in integrating other states in the European Union. However, Russia from the 
Polish elite perspective does not like the Eastern partnership program on being part of the EU 
system. In an interview, Poland’s Foreign Minister, Rados!aw Sikorski, indicated that an 
Eastern partnership with Poland’s neighbors (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia) 187 
Poland’s leaders have pushed for an Eastern Partnership, realizing that states like Ukraine 
and Georgia might not ever become members of NATO.  According to Poland’s security 
interests, it is better to have a region that is pro-Western then one that is influenced by Russia.  
Hence, an economic partnership might improve Western relations with aspiring members of 
NATO, while obviating worry over Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion towards the 
East.   However, Poland alone might not be able to accomplish this task, since a US-Russian 
reset in relations seems more important for the US.  The 2009 Defense Strategy of the 
Republic of Poland clearly identifies the Georgia-Russia conflict as a parochial threat as it  
…demonstrated the topicality of traditional military threats and the importance of 
military force, also in Europe’s backyard....[as the] probability of a local conflict 
occurring close to Poland’s border cannot be excluded.188 
   
But what does the future hold for Poland’s reliance on Trans-Atlantic security? On 
January 24, 2012, the European Defense and Security Conference discussed the evolution of 
European security.  According to the conference’s findings, defense “has seemingly come to 
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a crucial moment in its history…. marked by less spending, fewer interventions and less 
cooperation continues, Europe’s ability to provide security will be questioned.”189  
 One might argue that relying on other states to provide collective security is very 
dangerous.  Realist critics of collective security like Charles A. Kupchan support individual-
state security over collective security, since collective security “at its worst is roughly 
equivalent to balancing under anarchy at its best is that collective security encourages 
member states to count on the assistance of others, thereby leaving a directly threatened 
coalition underprepared for war if the system unravels.”190  According to Kupchan, in a 
hypothetical situation, the instruments that provide collective security would collapse little by 
little, since not all states are ready for the process of war.  States that are endangered would 
be aware that the coalition could not provide adequate defense capabilities, and some 
members would draw back and others would have to compensate by increasing their 
forces.191 
 Realistically, if Poland’s sovereignty was violated it could be difficult, if not 
impossible, to get NATO consensus for collective action (i.e., the invocation of Article 5).  
NATO consensus is a highly politicized approval process that is usually hampered by 
member states’ interests.  For instance, NATO members like Germany and France would risk 
their good relations with Russia if they allowed Georgia to become a member of NATO, as 
occurred when Georgia attempted to join.192  It has been fours years since the accession 
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process for Georgia’s membership to NATO came to a halt.  In a recent official visit to 
Georgia, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen seemed to support the idea 
of Georgia joining NATO.  Rasmussen replied to Georgian reporters (in the presence of 
President Mikheil Saakashvili), that “no third country [Russia] has any right to interfere with 
NATO decisions, it’s for NATO to decide on our open door policy and we have stated over 
and over again and reinterpreted in Chicago [the NATO Chicago Summit on May 2012] that 
our door remains open.”193   
According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty signed on April 4, 1949, the Alliance 
would take the appropriate action if one of its members were ever attacked or was a victim of 
a military/terrorist conflict.194  In other words, what Article 5 provides is a broad and 
somewhat ambiguous definition of what members of NATO or the Security Council consider 
to be “appropriate actions.” As illustrated in Article 5,  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them…in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence … will assist the Party or Parties so attacked 
by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary.195 
 
Hence, one could speculate whether the Polish security strategy rests on multi-lateral defense 
initiatives as an alternative to NATO’s collective security as an insurance policy in case 
members of the Alliance do not invoke Article 5. 
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 State participation in “collective defense” even in contingency operations abroad 
demands a legal framework or a lengthy approval process. A state’s internal affairs also play 
a vital role in deciding whether to participate in NATO military operations.  Differences of 
opinion between NATO member states exist, especially between Germany and France: 
France agrees with using force only following the approval of the United Nations, where as 
Germany believes that NATO has a responsibility to aid any state that asks for assistance 
regardless of whether it is a NATO member.196   
 In an international legal framework, the UN Charter specifies what constitutes self-
defense if a state’s sovereignty is undermined.  According to the UN Charter, Chapter VII, 
Article 51, a state has “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…. [and] shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”197 
 The Poles have been especially concerned (more than any other NATO member) with 
European security.  In order to ensure growth in European security, a permanent structured 
cooperation (PESCO) was formed in 2002 with stringent membership requirements.  Even 
though PESCO was formed under the Lisbon treaty, no one is a more committed member 
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than Poland to establishing a collective defense against a belligerent state or terrorist 
organization.198 
 Nationalist policies also affect who is able to contribute to NATO or EU operations.  
While Poland’s six-month term as EU president in July 2011 tried to improve the European 
Union’s command structure and battle group capacity, it itself did not participate in the 
NATO air operation (Operation Unified Protector) against Libya.199  Members of NATO and 
the EU continue to pursue their own agendas, making policy-cohesion difficult to achieve.  In 
an effort to limit domestic interests, EU governance attempts to downplay individual-member 
interests by pressuring governments to abide by the EU rules.200  However, the EU 
governance pressure does not always work, as domestic politics and economies dictate the 
behavior of states. 
 Poland can still influence others with its economic strength, since it continues to be a 
good and valuable partner.  Poland’s defense industry is tied to its strategic government 
programs. Poland has already reestablished its defense industry by manufacturing tanks, 
Black Hawk helicopters (through the sister company of the US Sikorsky aircraft 
manufacturer), self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, armored recovery vehicles, components 
for US and Canadian firms, Grom rockets, and small arms (assault and sniper rifles).201  The 
Bumar Group, the state-owned defense company in Poland, is spending profits from its sales 
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around the world money on R&D; the latest Bumar Group contract was with BELM, an 
Indian defense company, in the amount of $275 million. 202 
 The current government of Poland, lead by Komorowski and Tusk, has clarified its 
position in building the defense industry – specifically the Bumar Group and the state-owned 
Huta Stalowa Wola defense manufacturer – as an exporter and supplier of defense products 
domestically and abroad. In the interest of safeguarding the economy and the defense 
industry by providing jobs, an official announcement was made by Tusk that Poland would 
purchase military armament contracts worth approximately $3 billion dollars (10 billion 
zloty) in the next two years (2013-14).203  This move demonstrates Poland’s understanding 
that the defense industry is a national asset that should also be protected. In order for a 
defense industry to be healthy, it needs maintain a technological edge and be economically 
strong to survive in the future.204 
 Global security challenges cannot be ignored, as a weak NATO undermines global 
stability.  Poland has NATO, and as part of the Alliance, it can have its security concerns 
addressed without seeking smaller bilateral alliances. Paul Gallis of Congressional Research 
Service mentions, that, “the Alliance is a mutual defense organization, where supreme 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 Adamowski, Jaroslaw (2012, April 19). New Bumar CEO To Boost Foreign Sales, R&D Spending. Defense 
News. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com/print/article/20120419/DEFREG01/ 304190007/New-
Bumar-CEO-Boost-Foreign-Sales-R-D-Spending 
 
203 Adamowski, Jaroslaw. (2012, October 24). Poland’s Spending Up as Most of E. Europe Cuts Back, 
defensenews.com. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121024/DEFREG01/310240002/ 
Poland-8217-s-Spending-Up-Most-E-Europe-Cuts-Page 
 
204 Watts, B. D. & Todd Harrison. (2011). Sustaining Critical Sectors of the U.S.. Defense Industrial Base. 2011 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: 82;37 
!!
==!
national interests such as the survival of a country and the lives of a government’s soldiers 
are at issue.”205 
 Poland and other EU states will be safer if the United States remains in NATO.   
Military-to-military cooperation between NATO members might build confidence and help 
to avoid security competition, but it does not prevent the possibility of war between them. 
Poland would not need to elevate its national defense capabilities if the United States 
remained on European soil.  Promoting national security over collective security would make 
states behave in a competitive manner by not heeding neighboring states’ concerns.206  By 
retaining the United States as a powerful leader in NATO, other member-states can avoid 
thinking about the prospect of a possible confrontation with each other.  The US has 
historically built trust and displayed leadership not only during the Cold War, but also into 
the post-Cold War period. This being said, US participation in NATO has burdened the 
American taxpayer, since the US spends a considerable amount of GDP on defense. 
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CHAPTER XI:  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Today, Poland’s security needs are met by its North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) membership and through a US-Polish bilateral agreement; secondary features of 
Poland’s strategic policy are NATO’s air policing, quick response forces, and air missile 
defense capabilities, and a US military cooperation that improves Poland’s military 
capabilities.  Recently, Poland has been concerned with NATO’s ability to carry out its 
collective security guarantees should America’s military depart from Europe. 
 I address in this thesis whether a shift in US military strategy towards Asia coupled 
with Europe’s declining military budget poses a threat to Poland’s security apparatus.  To 
answer this question required extensive research using primary and secondary sources from 
the Internet, as well as printed reference material.  Published books, journals, magazines, 
government documents, reports, newspapers, and encyclopedias dating from the 1970s 
through the present were also utilized in an attempt to argue my answer qualitatively and 
methodically.  I also analyzed additional sources from security conferences, political 
statements, reports, and think tanks. I made every effort to remain neutral and unbiased by 
examining multiple American, Polish, and European literature on security.  By looking 
through different lenses, I was able to present a broad perspective on Polish and NATO 
security.
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 Revisiting Polish history was vital to understand the genesis of Poland’s security and 
its evolution.  In the Interwar period (1919-39) and throughout the devastating affects of 
World War II, a Polish security culture emerged along with a distrust in alliances that persists 
even until today.  During the Cold War (1947–1991) Poland’s security relied upon the 
Warsaw Pact, but in the post-Cold War period (1992-present), the country started down the 
road toward an independent security policy.  In the 1990s, Poland’s security and government 
institutions went through a difficult transformation.  Through NATO membership, Poland 
was able to modernize, train, and transform its military into a NATO-interoperable military 
force. The resulting policies for protecting Poland’s territory and sovereignty rely on the 
protection of the state by internal (domestic armed capabilities) and external means (NATO, 
European Defense, and regional alliances).   
 Since its NATO accession in 1999, Poland has been active in NATO operations.  
Poland surpassed the Alliance’s expectations in carrying out its military and political 
commitments.  Poland has volunteered for more dangerous combat-related missions in both 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than its Western European counterparts.  As a result, Poland 
has been able to establish a functional US-Polish strategic partnership.   
 A US-Polish strategic partnership is important because both countries benefit in one 
way or another through the relationship. Poland’s military involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan supports US interests, just as a US-Polish strategic relationship is important to 
Poland.  America values Poland as an ally just as Poland relies on America for its security 
interests. As part of a strategic relationship, Poland has trained, modernized, and equipped its 
military with US assistance.  Poland’s security concerns can also be politically backed by the 
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US in NATO, and Poland satisfies its strategic security policy stipulations by aligning itself 
with NATO. 
 In assessing Poland’s security, I investigated the ways it benefited from NATO 
membership.  Poland receives three security benefits, which are the foundational elements  of 
hard power: air policing, aircraft monitoring of Poland’s airspace and that of its allies, the 
NATO Response Force, a rapid and deployable aggregate of NATO military forces, and the 
Air Defense, a NATO missile shield comprised of national assets with air and missile 
defense capabilities.  Poland’s concerns include Europe’s ability to uphold NATO’s 
collective security contract (Article 5), which provides assistance to an injured member in a 
belligerent conflict, without US assistance. 
! In the wake of the war in Afghanistan, many of Poland’s European allies have 
changed their views on military commitments.  As a result, Poland has concerns about the 
ability of the Alliance to perform security tasks.  I asked several questions in order to identify 
the capabilities issues of the Alliance: Could downsizing national military capabilities in 
Europe compromise Poland’s security in terms of its territorial integrity or sovereignty?  To 
what extent are cuts to the defense budget affecting NATO’s ability to respond to Article 5?  
Are the pooling and sharing and smart defense initiatives realistic solutions to the shortfall in 
military capabilities and budgetary cuts in Europe, even if the Alliance members feel uneasy 
entrusting their state sovereignty to one another? The answers to these questions became 
clearer after I analyzed NATO’s largest contributors to see how much they would impact 
European security should their military capabilities diminish. 
 A military capability gap on both sides of the Atlantic is apparent, and the US 
continues to narrow it by maintaining its presence in Europe.  NATO members like the 
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United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany will undergo a military 
transformation. National defense spending will be steady for Germany and France, but the 
United Kingdom will continue to decrease its military budget; certain military capabilities 
will be negatively impacted, if not diminished, but others will improve.  The 2012 US budget 
did not indicate any significant cuts to NATO.  US spending for the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will continue as planned until the full implementation of the 
defense missile shield.  Poland will be hosting a segment of NATO’s missile defense system, 
and also plans to acquire its own missile defense. 
 Poland has remained steady in its defense expenditures and will increase its spending 
in the years ahead because of public support and a good economy.  In addition, Poland is in 
the process of making amendments to a 2001 statute on the technical modernization of 
Poland’s military forces.  These changes would allow Poland to finance its own modernized 
missile defense capabilities.  Poland’s politicians will continue to rally their constituents and 
persuade their voters that defense spending is necessary for Poland’s security.  The Polish 
government announced that a Polish missile defense would not only contribute to the wider 
NATO missile defense platform but would also boost the Polish defense industry. Poland’s 
political elites have embraced a strategic philosophy that appeals to the public: Poland’s 
territorial security and sovereignty can never be compromised as occurred tragically during 
WWII.  At times, Poland’s government officials do not share similar interests or goals, since 
they support their constituents’ interests.  A major proponent of security is Poland’s defense 
industry, a largely state-owned enterprise. It is evident that 3,6*/(.1!0,-.(.1/!.7!+,-273!0-2:!
27!.60,4(27(!4,-*!.7!()*!/*1(,4!,8!3*8*7/*D!*/0*1.2--:!A)*7!42--:.79!/E00,4(*4/!8,4!
*-*1(*3!,88.1.2-/!273!A)*7!2A243.79!3*8*7/*!1,7(421(/I  Nonetheless, Poland’s security 
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concerns resurfaced when America announced a strategic shift from Europe towards Asia on 
January 2012. 
 An American strategic refocus to Asia and the Pacific will not threaten Poland’s 
security, in spite of concerns from either side of the Atlantic. Both US military commanders 
and European leaders have suggested that the American withdrawal from NATO 
commitments would detriment Europe’s ability to protect itself.  The 2012 US military 
budget requests for Asia only constituted a small portion of the entire defense budget, and did 
not affect funding for NATO commitments. The budget for Asia only supplements current 
technology through upgrades and provides funding for future military aircraft designs.  
Shifting American assets from Europe, however, might create a security vacuum that could 
not be filled by Europe’s military forces.  
 It could be dangerous to European security to rely solely on US commitments to the 
Alliance.   Because of a persisting security culture, Poland feels a need to rely on America’s 
power projection capabilities, including strategic assets and unique military capabilities, as 
well as its missile defense for its strategic security requirements.  The Polish political elite 
has tried to reinforce its ability to combat perceived threats to territorial security, but it 
remains concerned that members of NATO view threat differently, including Poland’s 
Eastern and Central neighbors.  Traditionally, military aggression against a NATO member 
ought to elicit protection from the other members.  With this in mind, Poland’s objective will 
be to remind the Alliance of the importance of collective security.  
 What does the future hold for Poland in terms of trans-Atlantic security? On January 
24, 2012, the European Defense and Security Conference discussed the future of European 
security.  According to the conference’s findings, because defense and security “has 
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seemingly come to a crucial moment in its history…. marked by less spending, fewer 
interventions and less cooperation continues, Europe’s ability to provide security will be 
questioned.”207  In a 1995 article, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO,” 
Robert J. Art raised similar security concerns for Europe. Art warned in response to concerns 
that Europe no longer takes collective security seriously that, “It is both wrong and 
dangerous to believe that security and power no longer motivate the Western European states 
in their relations with one another….[It is] dangerous because policy based on this mistaken 
view carries the risk of disastrous outcomes.”208 From a Polish perspective, a European 
consensus on defense seems unlikely, as Europe’s focus is on its socio-economic problems, 
not protection of the homeland. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Figure 1. Defense GDP Expenditures (2007-11)211 
 
 
Poland’s Defense Expenditures (on 1995 constant prices) per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in Comparison to NATO, NATO-Europe, United States, and Other NATO member-states 
from 2007-11. 
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